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BEYOND CONTROL?: THE RISE AND FALL OF
DEFAMATION REGULATION ON THE
INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls.
Who steals my purse, steals trash; ’tis something,
nothing,
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands:
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.1
“Have you seen this?”2 This was the subject of an e-mail message
received by a female law student from another classmate one afternoon,
and as the classmate was speculative as to its contents, she decided to
open the intriguing message. Inside the message contained a link to a
contest for “The ‘Most Appealing’ Women @ Top Law Schools.”
However, what lay beneath this catchy title was anything but appealing;
the site displayed three personal pictures of this particular law student.
The first two were from her friend’s fashion show and the other of her at
a beach in Santorini wearing only a bathing suit. The caption beneath
the picture read “[f]or a self-proclaimed feminist, [Jane Doe] loves
objectifying herself in front of cameras. I guess it’s empowerment when
she does it, and exploitation when others do it, because she is in law
school.”
While she did not consent to being entered into this
demoralizing contest, the law student had posted her pictures on
websites like Flickr, Facebook, YouTube, MySpace, and Friendster—
something that she later lamented.3 This simple task is certainly not
unusual. In fact, most of her friends posted similarly personal pictures
on the same or similar sites but were not subject to the scorn that
overshadowed this particular law student.
With little other recourse, the law student e-mailed the website
coordinators and asked to be removed from the competition, but there
was no response. Later, a message appeared on the website stating the
pictures would not be taken down until after the competition. Again, the
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
This hypothetical is completely fictional and entirely the creation of the author. Any
resemblance to real persons or facts is coincidental.
3
See infra note 28 (discussing these and other websites that allow users to post and
share their pictures).
1
2
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law student made a request of the coordinators to take down the
material—again, no response. Indeed, it seemed that all her requests
generated was retaliation by hosts and users posting nasty comments
about the women and speculating as to their promiscuity. The
comments included, “i would like to [expletive deleted] [Jane Doe] but
since people say she has herpes that might be a bad idea[,]” and the site
attacked the reputations of a number of female law students, solely so
that a bunch of Internet spectators could vote on their favorite
“CGWBT,” shorthand for “cheerful girl with big tits[.]”4 Within days,
the contest generated nearly 2,000 hits on Google.5
Over the years, the Internet has transformed into something much
different than its bulletin board predecessors.6 It is no longer merely a
facet of computing technology; today, it is a part of entertainment,
consumer spending, and popular culture.7 The Internet has fused
4
Posting of Patterico to Patterico's Pontifications, http://patterico.com/2007/06/13/
volokh-on-the-autoadmit-lawsuit/ (June 13, 2007, 6:01). This quote was extracted to prove
the degree of insult that can be found online. See id.
5
See Posting of Jill Filipovic to Feministe, http://www.feministe.us/blog/archives/
2007/03/07/wapo-calls-out-law-school-pervs/ (Mar. 7, 2007).
See also Posting of
DavidRosen to AutoAdmit, http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=643868&
forum_id=2#8243886 (June 11, 2007, 20:38) (the attorney bringing the lawsuit posted a
summons on the AutoAdmit website under the user name DavidRosen). This introduction
closely traces the facts alleged by a defamed law student, and are the subject of a complaint
filed June 11, 2007 in the U.S. District Court in Connecticut by two other law students
defamed on the same website. Id. The suit, filed by two female law students, named as
defendants Anthony Ciolli, a former director of the website, and a number of other users
who posted the students’ photos as well as defamatory and threatening remarks about
them on the AutoAdmit law school discussion forum. Id. The lawsuit sought more than
$200,000 in punitive damages for defamation and demanded the offensive postings be
taken down. Posting of Amir Efrati to Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/06/12/
students-file-suit-against-autoadmit-director-others/ (June 12, 2007, 11:42). As a result of
this lawsuit, Anthony Ciolli will be forced to realize the real-world consequence of Internet
defamation because his post-graduation job offer has been rescinded as a direct result of his
involvement in the AutoAdmit scandal. Id. In March 2009, Portfolio Magazine published
an update to this cyber-bullying lawsuit. David Margolick, Slimed Online, Portfolio
Magazine, http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/
11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying (discussing the lawsuit and defendants that have
been charged to date).
6
See infra Part II.A and accompanying text (discussing the transition for bulletin boards
to online web journals).
7
See, e.g., Pew Internet & American Life Project, Reports: Online Activities & Pursuits,
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/c/1/topics.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). This study
reports the most popular internet uses, including but not limited to, video-sharing,
information searches, web journals, hobbies, online video and pictures, and social
networking sites. Id. For example, the study reports that “[m]ore than half (55%) of all
online American youths ages 12–17 use online social networking sites.” Id. And, perhaps
even more startlingly, the study reports that 28% of teens have their own web journal, more
commonly referred to as a “blog.” Id.
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analytical computing with the mainstream social life in America.8
Moreover, the ability of users to access the Internet has increased.9 The
Internet no longer requires technical computing language to navigate
effectively; instead, the Internet is provided by the mere click of a mouse,
and widespread broadband Internet access allows virtually anyone to
become a publisher.10
This increased freedom has given way to new forms of publication,
including weblogs, or “blogs[,]” typically produced by individuals as
merely a pastime, or increasingly more common, as an income yielding,
self-made enterprise.11
Collectively, the blogs comprise the
See, e.g., JOHN HORRIGAN & LEE RAINIE, THE INTERNET’S GROWING ROLE IN LIFE’S
MAJOR MOMENTS (Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIP_Major%20Moments_2006.pdf. This study reports that the Internet developed as an
important medium to individuals’ everyday lives. Id. In fact, “[t]he proportion of
Americans online on a typical day grew from 36% of the entire adult population in January
2002 to 44% in December 2005.” Id. at 1. Likewise, “[t]he number of adults who
[reportedly] said they logged on at least once a day from home rose from 27% of American
adults in January 2002 to 35% in late 2005.” Id. Moreover, for many Internet users “the
[I]nternet has become a crucial source of information . . . fully 45% of [I]nternet users, or
about 60 million Americans, say that the [I]nternet helped them make big decisions or
negotiate their way through major episodes in their lives in the previous two years.” Id.
9
See, e.g., JOHN HORRIGAN, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 2006, Pew Internet &
American Life Project (May 28, 2006), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/
PIP_Broadband_trends2006.pdf. The number of Americans with broadband Internet access
in their homes increased from 60 to 84 million between March 2005 and March 2006. Id. at
i. In addition, the study reports that 48 million Americans have posted content on the
Internet. Id. at ii. Broadband Internet adoption also increased by 14% over the 2006
numbers, as reported in a 2007 update report. See JOHN HORRIGAN & AARON SMITH, HOME
BROADBAND ADOPTION 2007, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Jul. 3, 2007),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband%202007.pdf.
10
See, e.g., JOHN B. HORRIGAN, A TYPOLOGY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION
TECHNOLOGY USERS, Pew Internet & American Life Project (May, 7, 2007), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_ICT_Typology.pdf.
This study explains that
more than half of Americans regularly used the Internet or engaged devices that connect to
the Internet, and it further describes a broad spectrum of Internet users including: the most
active users termed “Web 2.0 users,” less active users that appreciate Internet devices but
own relatively few, and the least active users that are satisfied using very few Internet
devices. Id. at i. The term Web 2.0 is instructive in any discussion of the history of the
Internet and is often used to describe users or ideas at the forefront of innovation. See Tim
O’Reilly, O’Reilly—What Is Web 2.0 (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/
oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html. Web 2.0 is a term that was created
during a brainstorming session after the crash of the Internet when Internet advocates
feared that there would not be an adoption of the Internet by everyday consumers. Id.
Web 2.0 replaced the double-clicking, directory based “sticking” feel with a new interactive
approach that led to Google, Wikipedia, and other more seamless web applications. Id.
11
See Stephen Baker & Heather Green, Blogs Will Change Your Business, BUSINESS WEEK
56, May 2, 2005, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_18/
b3931001_mz001.htm. This article boldly states that Internet users should not turn their
heads to the influence of blogs: “you cannot afford to close your eyes to them, because
8
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“blogosphere[,]” and in much the same way a small leak can become a
flood, the collective power of the blogosphere can likewise have a
tremendous impact.12
As with all emerging media, the Internet has experienced its fair
share of growing pains, as legislatures and the law struggle to keep
pace.13 Despite the increasing number of publishers, a majority of the
recent legislation drafted by Congress to regulate or potentially stifle
online speech has misunderstood, or largely ignored, the speed of
technology that has given new life to the threat defamation poses on the
Internet.14 Moreover, while many of the present problems facing the
Internet have existed since its inception, it was not until 1995 that the
first law review article appeared with “[d]efamation” and “Internet” in

they’re simply the most explosive outbreak in the information world since the Internet
itself.” Id. Moreover, the article accurately describes the transformation from printing
presses to blogs, noting the extremely low barriers to entry that make this new form of
publication so incredibly influential. Id.
12
Id. This article concludes its discussion of mass media by stating as follows:
The printing press set the model for mass media. A lucky handful
owns the publishing machinery and controls the information.
Whether at newspapers or global manufacturing giants, they decide
what the masses will learn. This elite still holds sway at most
companies. You know them. They generally park in sheltered spaces,
have longer rides on elevators, and avoid the cafeteria. They keep the
secrets safe and coif the company’s message. Then they distribute it -usually on a need-to-know basis -- to customers, employees, investors,
and the press.
That’s the world of mass media, and the blogs are turning it on its
head. Set up a free account at Blogger or other blog services, and you
see right away that the cost of publishing has fallen practically to zero.
Any dolt with a working computer and an Internet connection can
become a blog publisher in the 10 minutes it takes to sign up.
Sure, most blogs are painfully primitive. That’s not the point. They
represent power. Look at it this way: In the age of mass media,
publications like ours print the news. Sources try to get quoted, but
the decision is ours. Ditto with letters to the editor. Now instead of
just speaking through us, they can blog. And if they master the ins
and outs of this new art -- like how to get other bloggers to link to
them -- they reach a huge audience.
Id.
13
See infra Part II.A (discussing the implications and criticisms of regulation on the
Internet in recent years).
14
See infra note 30; see also Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A
Framework for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 ALBANY L.
REV. 1083 (1996); Paul R. Niehaus, Comment, Cyberlibel: Workable Liability Standards?, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 617 (1996); C. Waelde & L. Edwards, Defamation and the Internet: A Case
Study of Anomalies and Difficulties in the Information Age, 10 INT’L REVIEW OF LAW COMPUTERS
& TECH. 263 (1996).
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its title.15 Although Congress has made some attempt to protect Internet
users and shift liability for defamatory acts, little change has actually
occurred, and many of the underlying concepts behind the intended
progress are conclusively unsound.16
To deal with the speed of cyberspace, legislatures and courts are
often faced with three conflicting methods: the first, to proceed leniently
allowing the technology to develop its own self-regulation; the second,
to proceed definitively through the development of cyberlaws that
establish order ahead of technology; and, the third, to proceed
cautiously, applying pre-existing laws, so that they might better
understand cyberspace before enacting more comprehensive
regulations.17 Among these conflicting methods, both the courts and
15
See Thomas D. Brooks, Note, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public-Figure Doctrine
and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461 (1995)
(located through a search of Westlaw’s database of “Journals and Law Reviews Combined”
(JLR) in January 2008 for article titles which include “defamation” and “Internet”).
16
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority in the affirmed decision, included observations of the
three-judge district court panel to conclude that the Internet was a unique mode of
communication. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). More specifically, Judge Datzell,
the District Court Judge, after examining the extensive findings of fact before the court,
described the Internet as unique for a number of reasons:
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these
barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third, as
a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available
on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all
who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity
among the speakers.
Reno, 929 F. Supp at 877. In fact, the concept of a unique Internet environment acted as an
undercurrent throughout much of Stevens’s opinion, and assisted in characterizing the
Internet has wholly unique from other forms of broadcast media. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.
However, the Court recognized that some of its prior decisions were predicated on special
justifications for regulating broadcast media that may be inapplicable for other types of
speakers. Id. at 868. Moreover, Stevens distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978), by stating that the FCC had “decades” of experience in regulating radio
broadcast communication, but the CDA provided no opportunity for oversight by an
agency “familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet.” Id. at 867. In short,
Stevens cited precedent in which the Court acknowledged that “[e]ach medium of
expression . . . may present its own problems[,]” and the weight of these various
distinguishing factors will further limit First Amendment protection. Id. at 868 (alterations
in original). Thus, the government’s attitude toward the Internet, manifested by
Congress’s cursory manner in enacting the CDA, shows that, at least on some level, the
government misunderstands the true nature of the Internet. Id. As the Court suggests, if
Congress wishes to effectively regulate the Internet, a full understanding is at the very least
necessary, if not mandatory. Id.
17
See infra Parts III, V.
See Joseph Reagle, Why the Internet is Good,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/reagle/regulation-19990326.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2008).Lawrence Lessig was the first to identify a total of four factors that regulate
cyberspace: laws (describing this approach as the use of government sanction and force);
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legislature have yet to decide on one best practice, and as a result, the
governing law has grown increasingly inconsistent.18
This Note attempts to resolve the debate over best practices, in
particular, in the area of defamation law.19 The importance of the
Internet as an emerging medium of communication and the limited
success in its regulation requires increased evaluation of the
methodologies employed, and the reasons for their failure.20 This Note
combines the existing regulation furthering the first approach with the
more traditional third approach and encourages the use of both methods
as a modest approach to regulation of defamatory communications on
the Internet, in lieu of passing more comprehensive legislation when the
Internet escapes its infancy.21 This method provides increased protection
from liability in the case of small-scale bloggers, and ensures that
individuals defamed online receive some form of retribution, even in the
likely event of suit against a judgment-proof defendant. 22 Moreover,
this method may provide a powerful tool for plaintiffs to use against
expanding ISP immunity by, at the very least, requiring some action with
regard to defamatory statements posted on websites.23
In support of this thesis, this Note begins in Part II by exploring the
history, growth, and development of the Internet into an influential
medium dominated by individuals, with an eye toward its structure and
regulation throughout the past two decades.24 Building on this outline of
the Internet’s current structure and prior regulatory attempts, Part III
provides an analysis of the three current regulatory methods employed
by the legislatures, interpreted by the courts, and criticized by the
social norms (implying regulation by expectation, encouragement, or embarrassment);
markets (regulation by price and availability); and architecture (described as what
technology permits, favors, dissuades, or prohibits). Id.
18
See infra note 86 (discussing the three Internet regulation methods, including: selfregulation, cyberlaws, and the application of traditional laws).
19
See infra Parts III, V (condensing the three regulatory methods employed throughout
the Internet’s recent history that developed in large part from Lawrence Lessig’s four
factors, then analyzing the methods’ flaws and inconsistencies).
20
See infra Parts III, V (analyzing the drawbacks of the three main regulatory methods
employed by legislatures, courts, and academics during the Internet’s most recent history).
21
See infra Part IV (suggesting that applying traditional laws to the Internet is a solution
to the existing and emerging Internet regulatory problems arising within Congress’s
existing self-help regulations).
22
See infra Part IV (describing the unique nature of the Internet and the problems
various legislative initiatives have encountered in trying to regulate the Internet, and
discussing the call for more principled legislation that accounts for the ever-changing
Internet infrastructure).
23
See infra Part IV (asserting that the immunity of ISPs from liability for damages may
not include immunity from injunctive or declaratory relief).
24
See infra Part II (discussing the background and history of the Internet).
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academic community, in regard to the ever-growing Internet
community.25 This analysis attempts to highlight each method’s
drawbacks, including structural incompatibility and inconsistent
application.26 Next, Part IV recommends that legislatures and the courts
adopt an effective, but modest, approach to the regulation of Internet
defamation law, by using the self-help purpose of existing Internet
regulation in tandem with the existing bricks and mortar legal principles,
under a too-often dismissed wait-and-see approach.27 Finally, Part V
concludes by assessing the nature of the current problems of
unprovided-for plaintiffs and increasingly large liability for potentially
judgment-proof defendants in the context of the Internet’s history. In
addition, Part V provides modest recommendations for legislative
priorities to address these issues, which if followed could provide not
only a timely solution to this conflict but could also provide longawaited action by previously immune ISPs. Throughout, this Note
encourages lawmakers and policymakers to consider the trend toward
establishing virtual identities that closely track real identities, in large
part brought on by the advent of social networking sites like Facebook28
and MySpace,29 and the implications of a system largely ill-equipped to
address electronic defamation actions.30
See infra Part III (analyzing three regulatory methods that have emerged upon close
examination of the Internet’s recent history).
26
See infra Parts III.A, C (discussing the self-regulation, cyberlaw, and traditional law
approaches respectively).
27
See infra Part IV (discussing an approach that would incorporate the existing self-help
framework established by Congress with the long-established common law principles of
retraction to provide victims of cyberwrong relief that is not currently available).
28
Facebook, About Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/about.php (last visited Nov.
8, 2007). “Facebook gives people the power to share and makes the world more open and
connected. Millions of people use Facebook everyday to keep up with friends, upload an
unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more about the people they
meet.” Id. Facebook was created by Mark Zuckerberg, a Harvard student. Krista Naposki,
Facebook: The Craze that has Crashed into College Life May Have Other Consequences,
PENDULUM, Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.elon.edu/e-web/pendulum/Issues/
2006/01_19/features/specialfeature.xhtml. Mr. Zuckerberg created the website as a
replacement to the freshman-year ID photos and information booklets. Id. But, after nearly
“6,000 Harvard students signed up within the first three weeks, he started to offer the
service to other schools.” Id. There are a multitude of reasons students choose to join, such
as the fact that students who join the website get personal pages on which they can post
their pictures, cell phone numbers, class schedules, and even sexual orientation
information. Id. On Campus: Facing Facebook, ATHLETIC MANAGEMENT, June/July 2006, at
6. For students, “it’s a fun and easy way to meet new friends and keep in touch with old
ones.” Id.
29
MySpace, About Us—MySpace.com, http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuse
action=misc.aboutus (last visited Nov. 8, 2007). “MySpace is an online community that lets
you meet your friends’ friends.” Id. MySpace is open to the general public and is largely
appealing to both teenagers and adults. Id. In order to establish an account, a valid e-mail
25
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II. BACKGROUND
As the Internet continues to grow, legislatures and courts face
difficult questions regarding how to apply the law of defamation to
defamatory remarks made in cyberspace.31 With the increased speed of

address is all that is required. Id. A recent ComScore Media Metrix report, which tracks
Internet use, reports that “traffic on MySpace has grown 319 percent in the last year to 37.3
million visitors in February, making it the top networking site on the Web and the eighth
most popular website overall.” Jimmy Watson, Racy Website’s Have Coaches’, AD’s
Attention, SHREVEPORT TIMES, June 24, 2006, available at http://www.shreveporttimes.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060624/SPORTS/306240006/1001. Similarly, according to
a ComScore Media Metrix report, Facebook “has grown 272 percent in the past year,
making it the 66th most popular website in February.” See USATODAY.com, What you say
online could haunt you, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2006-0308-facebook-myspace_x.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2009). Id. Prior to 2006, the greatest
distinction between Facebook and MySpace was that Facebook was available only to
college students and alumni who maintained a valid school e-mail address. Facebook –
Timeline, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
However, in September 2005, Facebook opened its doors to millions of high school
students. Id. And, one year later on September 26, 2006, Facebook relaxed all of its
requirements allowing anyone to become a member. See Facebook – Press Releases,
http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=618 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
30
See infra Part II.A (discussing the framework of the Internet in its existing selfregulation state).
31
See Justin Hughes, The Internet and the Persistence of Law, 44 B.C. L. REV. 359 (2003)
(providing insight into the “‘no-law Internet,’ the ‘Internet as a separate jurisdiction,’ and
Internet law as a ‘translation’ of familiar legal concepts[]”); see also David R. Johnson &
David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); I.
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994); First
Amendment Center, Internet & First Amendment,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/internet/index.aspx (last visited Dec. 21,
2007) (arguing for a presumption of using “bottom up” private rules for cyberspace instead
of statutes or judicial decisions). Congress and the courts have addressed Internet
regulation in a variety of contexts, including, Internet filtering, indecency online, spam,
cybersquatting, online libel, virtual child pornography, copyright, cyberstalking and
blogging. Id. However, despite the many attempts by ISPs, Congress, and the courts to
regulate Internet speech, they have failed to adequately address the new threat that
defamation law poses on the Internet. See First Amendment Center, Internet & First
Amendment, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/speech/internet/topic.aspx?topic=
online_libel (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). In fact, major legislation in this area, most notably
the Communication Decency Act (“CDA”), has experienced extensive criticism by the
courts. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–81 (1997) (striking down two provisions of the
CDA, but not adopting a medium-specific standard for Internet speech). Moreover, many
authors criticized the CDA as not fluid enough to cope with the rapidly changing Internet.
See Praveen Goyal, Congress Fumbles With the Internet: Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997),
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 638 (1998). More specifically, this article stated, “Because of
the rapidly changing nature of telecommunications media such as the Internet and the
case-specific approach to speech regulation that the Court is likely to adopt in such an area,
congressional attempts at direct speech regulation are very likely to be inadequate and
constitutionally unsound.” Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss3/8

Horton: Beyond Control?: The Rise and Fall of Defamation Regulation on th

2009]

Regulating Internet-Based Defamatory Speech

1273

Internet innovation, the difference and inconsistencies between the
various methods used to approach the intersection of the law and the
Internet become more apparent.32 To understand the issues involving
best practices for defamation law on the Internet and to build a
framework for future regulation, it is essential to begin with a brief
overview of the Internet’s history.33 First, Part II explores the Internet
evolution, including the rise of virtual worlds and online communities.34
Next, Part II examines existing regulation of cyberspace that may affect
the breadth and scope of future regulations.35 Last, Part II addresses the
history of defamation law and retraction strategy.36
A. Defamation on the Internet: The Dynamics of the Law in Cyberspace
A brief introduction to the history of the Internet, including the more
recent development of online communities and online publishing, is
essential to understanding Internet defamation and the potential
solutions for its regulation in cyberspace.37 First, Part II.A.1 briefly
discusses the concept of the Internet and its development into a seamless
communication medium.38 Next, Part II.A.2 describes some of the more
popular online communities and forecasts coming attractions in online
life to better track innovation in the virtual world, including the virtual
self, and its impact on the law.39

See infra Part III (discussing the three current methods for Internet regulation—selfhelp, cyberlaws, and the application of traditional laws).
33
See infra Part II.
34
See infra Part II.A (discussing the evolution of the Internet to a widely accepted form
of mass media).
35
See infra Part II.B (discussing attempts to regulate the Internet).
36
See infra Part II.C (discussing defamation law and retraction strategy at the common
law, and later, as applied to the Internet).
37
See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998).
This information revolution has . . . presented unprecedented
challenges relating to rights of privacy and reputational rights of
individuals, . . . [given the] competition among journalists and news
organizations for instant news, rumors and other information that is
communicated so quickly that it is too often unchecked and unverified.
Needless to say, the legal rules that will govern this new medium are
just beginning to take shape.
Id.
38
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the early forms of Internet use).
39
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the introduction of the Internet to consumers).
32
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The Early Years: The Creation and Development of the Internet

In 1965, the Internet emerged as a new medium for
communication.40 The concept was simple—telephone lines already in
existence would allow multiple computers to “talk” with one another
and thereby share information.41 In 1969, this networking concept
spawned the creation of larger computer networks, most notably, the
Internet’s first appearance as the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network (“ARPANET”) throughout the 1960s and 1970s.42 At its
Barry M. Leiner et al., All About the Internet: History of the Internet, (Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml. The concept of the Internet stemmed
from a number of memoranda produced by J.C.R. Licklinder of MIT discussing a “Galactic
Network” that would globally interconnect information and allow access from any given
point on the network. Id.
41
Id. In 1965, Lawrence Roberts of MIT successfully connected a single computer in
Massachusetts with a single computer in California using dial-up telephone lines creating
the first computer network. Id.
42
See ROBERT J. DILLIGAN, COMPUTING IN THE WEB AGE: A WEB-INTERACTIVE
INTRODUCTION 30 (Plenum Press 1998). ARPA initially connected four major computers at
southwestern universities (UCLA, Stanford Research Institute, UC Santa Barbara, and the
University of Utah). Id. See also Shea on Behalf of American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp.
916, 925–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The joint stipulations in the case provide a brief overview of
the Internet’s history:
What we now refer to as the Internet grew out of an experimental
project of the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects
Administration (“ARPA”) designed to provide researchers with direct
access to supercomputers at a few key laboratories and to facilitate the
reliable transmission of vital communications. ARPA supplied funds
to link computers operated by the military, defense contractors, and
universities conducting defense-related research through dedicated
phone lines, creating a “network” known as ARPANet. Programs on
the linked computers implemented a technical scheme known as
“packet-switching,” through which a message from one computer to
another would be subdivided into smaller, separately addressed pieces
of data, known as “packets,” sent independently to the message’s
destination and reassembled upon arrival. Each computer on the
network was in turn linked to several other computers, creating any
number of routes that a communication from one computer could
follow to reach its destination. If part of the network were damaged, a
portion of the message could be re-routed automatically over any other
path to its ultimate destination, a characteristic of the network
intended initially to preserve its operability in the event of enemy
attack.
Having successfully implemented a system for the reliable
transfer of information over a computer network, ARPA began to
support the development of communications protocols for transferring
data between different types of computer networks. Universities,
research facilities, and commercial entities began to develop and link
together their own networks implementing these protocols; these
networks included a high-speed “backbone” network known as
40
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inception, the Internet was a very complex system, used primarily by
computer researchers, experts, engineers, and librarians.43 As familiarity
with this new network increased, so too did the many user-specific
advancements, including, in 1972, the first appearance of electronic mail,
or “e-mail” as it was later dubbed.44 Later, as the potential to improve
personal communication and achieve increased collaboration became
apparent, the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol
(“TCP/IP”)45 technology was developed to increase networking ability.46

NSFNet, sponsored by the National Science Foundation, smaller
regional networks, and, eventually, large commercial networks run by
organizations such as Sprint, IBM, and Performance Systems
International (commonly known as “PSI”). As faster networks
developed, most network traffic shifted away from ARPANet, which
formally ceased operations in 1990. What we know as “the Internet”
today is the series of linked, overlapping networks that gradually
supplanted ARPANet.
Because the Internet links together
independent networks that merely use the same data transfer
protocols, it cannot be said that any single entity or group of entities
controls, or can control, the content made publicly available on the
Internet or limits, or can limit, the ability of others to access public
content. Rather, the resources available to one with Internet access are
located on individual computers around the world.
It is estimated that as many as forty million individuals have
access to the information and tools of the Internet, and that figure is
expected to grow to 200 million by the year 1999. Access to the
Internet can take any one of several forms. First, many educational
institutions, businesses, libraries, and individual communities
maintain a computer network linked directly to the Internet and issue
account numbers and passwords enabling users to gain access to the
network directly or by modem. Second, “Internet service providers,”
generally commercial entities charging a monthly fee, offer modem
access to computers or networks linked directly to the Internet. Third,
national commercial “on-line services”—such as America Online,
CompuServe, Prodigy, and Microsoft Network—allow subscribers to
gain access to the Internet while providing extensive content within
their own proprietary networks. Finally, organizations and businesses
can offer access to electronic bulletin-board systems—which, like
national on-line services, provide certain proprietary content; some
bulletin-board systems in turn offer users links to the Internet.
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
43
Id.; see also FREDERICK BETZ, MANAGING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE FROM CHANGE 79–80 (John Wiley & Sons, 2d ed. 2003).
44
See Paul Frisman, E-Mail Dial ‘E’ for ‘Evidence’, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1
(praising e-mail as a “high-tech” means of communication); Amie M. Soden, Protect Your
Corporation from E-Mail Litigation; Privacy, Copyright Issues Should be Addressed in Policy,
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 1995, at 19 (describing e-mail as an integral part of the
technological explosion in communication).
45
TCP/IP Tutorial, http://www.w3schools.com/tcpip/default.asp (last visited Nov. 8,
2007). Communication protocols provide a series of rules for your computer to follow, the
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ARPANET was the largest of a number of other networks supported by
the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects
Administration (“ARPA”), and the new protocol significantly increased
the ability of users on one network to communicate with users on
different networks.47 As a direct result of this achievement, users were
able to more freely communicate across the resulting “network of
networks” by simply logging into a router and obtaining an Internet
Protocol (“IP”) address.48 By 1995, the Internet founders’s original
vision, to create a system of interconnected networks, greatly expanded
and resulted in an influx of 50,000 networks across the globe using the

end result of which is a user’s ability to use Internet browsers and servers to connect to the
Internet. Id.
46
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
FOR
COMPUTING RESEARCH (National Academy Press 1999), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=6323#orgs; Rita Tehan, Spinning the Web:
The History of Infrastructure of the Internet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Aug. 12, 1999, available at
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-1026:1. Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(quoting DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 16 (1994)). What started as
a single computer network for a government project grew to incorporate many additional
networks and developed the collective name of the Internet which in its most technical
sense is a “‘set of all interconnected IP networks’—the collection of several thousand local,
regional, and global computer networks interconnected in real time via the TCP/IP
Internetworking Protocol suite . . . . ” Id.
47
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
COMPUTING RESEARCH (National Academy Press 1999), available at
FOR
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=6323#orgs. A history of the Internet is
available in many additional published sources. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
830–31 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); JAMES GILLES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE
WEB WAS BORN: THE STORY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB (Oxford University Press 2000);
CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET: A CHRONOLOGY, 1843 TO THE
PRESENT (ABC-CLIO 1999); Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the
Information Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 191, 257–63 (2003) (discussing the origins of the
Internet).
48
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FUNDING A REVOLUTION: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
FOR
COMPUTING RESEARCH (National Academy Press 1999), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=6323&page=173; see also Internet, THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2004), available at
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Internet
(defining
Internet
as
“[a]n
interconnected system of networks that connects computers around the world via the
TCP/IP protocol[]”).
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TCP/IP protocol.49 Thus, the Internet, as envisioned by its founders, was
born.50
2.

The Advent of Cyberspace51

The increase in forums and the ability of Internet users to publish
information—through bulletin boards, chat rooms, and web journals,
often referred to as blogs—has created a greater threat of damage to
one’s reputation on a much larger scale.52 Defamation, libel, and slander
issues in cyberspace have all posed challenges for the law, and in order
to better understand the legal issues, one must first understand how the
information superhighway,53 and the growing cyber community, work.54
Susan P. Crawford, Internet Think, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 467, 470 (2007); see
also ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Penn. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (noting
that the ARPANET evolved to include networks catered to “universities, corporations, and
people around the world,” its first merger of networks produced the “DARPA Internet,”
and after later developments, it became known as simply the “Internet[]”).
50
See supra note 40 (discussing the desire for the Internet to grow into a galactic network
of sorts).
51
R. Timothy Muth, Old Doctrines on a New Frontier: Defamation and Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace, WIS. LAW. 10, 11 (Sept. 1995), available at Westlaw at 68-SEP WILAW 10.
“Cyberspace refers to the interaction of people and businesses over computer networks,
electronic bulletin boards and commercial online services. The largest and most visible
manifestation of cyberspace is the Internet—a worldwide network of networks
electronically connecting millions of computers and computer users.” Id.
52
See generally R. SCOTT HALL, THE BLOG AHEAD: HOW CITIZEN-GENERATED MEDIA IS
RADICALLY TILTING THE COMMUNICATIONS BALANCE (Deane Rink ed., Morgan James
Publishing, LLC 2006); Patrick Beeson, Blogging: What is it? And How Has It Affected the
Media?, THE QUILL, Mar. 2005, at 16 (citing Rebecca Blood, an authority on the nature of
blogs, who describes “blogs” as a “continuous, chronological series of posts—some inviting
comments from readers—on any topic imaginable, often containing links to sites
throughout the Internet”); Danielle M. Conway-Jones, Defamation in the Digital Age:
Liability in Chat Rooms, on Electronic Bulletin Boards, and in the Blogosphere, 29 ALI-ABA BUS.
L.J. 17, 21–22 (2005) (discussing the user services provided by leading blog sites—
www.xanga.com, www.blogspot.com, and www.livejournal.com).
53
Clay Calvert, Regulating Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality, and the Framing of Legal
Options, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 544 n.14 (1998); Computer Dictionary,
“Information Superhighway”, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/i/infosupe.htm
(last visited Dec. 21, 2007) (defining “Information Superhighway” as “[a] term coined by
Vice President Albert Gore when giving a speech January 11, 1994 to describe a future of
computers accessing and communicating over a world-wide network[]”). The site also
notes that “[l]ater during a CNN interview, Gore stated ‘During my service in the United
States Congress, I took the initiative in creating the Internet.’ This statement helped spark
the belief that Al Gore invented the Internet.” Computer Dictionary, “Information
Superhighway”, supra. But see New Network Institute, Chapter I Promises, Promises,
http://www.newnetworks.com/chapter1.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2007) (tracing the
coining of the term “Information Superhighway” to an April 12, 1993 issue of Time
Magazine bearing the cover “The Info Highway: Bringing a Revolution in Entertainment,
News and Communication: Coming Soon to your TV Screen[]”).
49
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Prior to Internet access becoming widely available, the consumer
based Internet developed largely as an Internet forum, known as a
Bulletin Board System (“BBS”), which was the primary online
community.55 The early BBSs allowed Internet users to publish and
receive messages on more than 10,000 newsgroups, each based upon a
particular topic of interest.56 This new soapbox style forum sparked
spirited debate on a wide-range of topics; however, it was not without
flaws as message posts often digressed to personal attacks against other
users, termed “flaming” by the system’s early adopters.57 An early
advantage of message boards was the allowance of greater content
control, often through the assignment of moderators, a feature that was
not offered by many of the BBSs’s early successors.58
54
See generally HALL, supra note 52. This source asserts its prediction regarding the
future of blogs:
Let me make a prediction. Five years from now, the blogosphere will
have developed into a powerful economic engine that has all but
driven newspapers into oblivion, has morphed (thanks to cell phone
cameras) into a video medium that challenges television news, and has
created a whole new group of major companies and media superstars.
Billions of dollars will be made by those prescient enough to either get
onboard or invest in these companies. At this point, the industry will
then undergo its first shakeout, with the loss of perhaps several million
blogs, though the overall industry will continue to grow at a steady
pace.
Id. at iii. (quoting Michael S. Malone, ABCNews.com, Silicon Insider Column, November 4,
2005).
55
See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 50 (2d ed., Blackwell
Publishing 2000) (noting that BBS systems “became the electronic notice-boards of all kinds
of interests and affinities, creating . . . ‘virtual communities[]’”). The BBS operated as a
computer network running software that enabled users, who dialed into the system over
the existing telephone framework, to download software and other information or upload
the same, and, in addition, allowed users to access news articles and to view and exchange
message posts with other users. Id. The appeal of the bulletin board system was its
functionality as a type of social network targeted for specific interest groups. Id. Today,
many of the old message boards are still available on Google. See FRANCES JACOBSON
HARRIS, I FOUND IT ON THE INTERNET: COMING OF AGE ONLINE 41 (American Library
Association 2005) (citing http://www.groups.google.com).
56
Muth, supra note 51, at 10–11. For an example of one of the first bulletin boards
created in 1996, UBB.classic (i.e. the Ultimate Bulletin Board), now in its most recent form
UBB.threads, see http://www.ubbcentral.com/. Id.
57
URS E. GATTIKER, THE INTERNET AS A DIVERSE COMMUNITY:
CULTURAL,
ORGANIZATIONAL, AND POLITICAL ISSUES 195 (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 2001)
(defining the term “flamed” as “[a] virulent and often largely personal attack against the
author of a posting on the Internet. Flaming occurs more frequently than is probably
desirable[]”); see also Mark Dery, Flame Wars, in FLAME WARS: THE DISCOURSE OF
CYBERCULTURE (Mark Dery, ed., Duke Univ. Press 1994) (further defining the concept of
flame wars).
58
Danielle M. Conway-Jones, Defamation in the Digital Age: Liability in Chat Rooms, on
Electronic Bulletin Boards, and in the Blogosphere, SK102 ALI-ABA 63, 67 (2005). Moderators
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Later, as the speed of the Internet increased, so too did the
popularity of Instant Messenger (“IM”) software.59 The IM system
improved upon the early editorial posting design of BBSs and allowed
users to enter virtual chat rooms “where two or more individuals
connected to the Internet [could] have real-time, synchronous
conversations” by simply typing messages to one another on their
computers.60 The speed and automatic posting qualities of IMs allowed
the majority of chat rooms to remain free from the editorial limitations
imposed by the message board predecessors and often allowed for little,
if any, content intervention.61
By the advent of the user-friendly World Wide Web—the weblog,
later dubbed the blog—evolved as an online journal. 62 In their infancy,
maintained the ability to delete, edit, or remove posts or engage in “other mechanisms
designed to keep the peace” on the message board. Id.
59
Id. The term “IM” is defined as follows: “[s]hort for Instant Messenger, IM is a
software utility that allows users connected to the Internet or a corporate network to
quickly send text messages and files between other IM users.” See Computer Dictionary,
“IM”, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/i/im.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). The
site includes a short list of some of the popular and widely used instant messenger
programs available today, including “AOL AIM (ICQ) – http://www.aim.com/, Google
Talk – http://www.google.com/talk/, Skype – http://www.skype.com, Jabber –
http://www.jabber.org/, MSN Messenger – http://messenger.msn.com/, Yahoo!
Messenger – http://messenger.yahoo.com/.” Id. In addition, Windows Live Messenger,
yet another instant messaging service, boasts of its ability to allow users to connect
instantly using text, voice, and video, or leave messages if the other user is unavailable. See
Windows Live Messenger – Overview, http://get.live.com/messenger/overview (last
visited Nov. 1, 2007).
60
See Conway-Jones, supra note 57. Chat rooms are further defined as
a “place” where two or more individuals connected to the Internet
have real-time, synchronous conversations (usually text based) by
typing messages into their computer. Groups gather to chat about
various subjects. As you type, everything you type is displayed to the
other members of the chat group. Some chat rooms are “moderated”
whereby certain messages are not broadcast because they do not
conform to the standards set up by the operator of the service.
Reasons for a message being blocked could include: discussion off the
topic, bad language, or repeat messaging especially of undesirable or
obscene text, known as flaming. The majority of chat rooms however,
remain “open” such that messages are posted automatically with no
human intervention. And, to complicate matters further, people may
enter chat rooms and begin discussion threads with prior verification
of user identity.
Id.
61
Id. The speed at which chat room speech operates is not unlike that of a telephone
and, therefore, became difficult, if not impossible, to regulate individual conversations in
real-time. Id.
62
See JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN: THE STORY OF THE
WORLD WIDE WEB 92–96 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). In 1989, Tim Berners-Lee, Sam Walker,
and Robert Cailliau created the concept for the World Wide Web. Id. One year later,
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blogs were simply the manually updated portions of otherwise static
websites.63 Today, blogs have made the creation and publication of
content online as simple as browsing the web.64 Thus, modern blogging
applications have removed virtually all of the technical barriers to
publication and are now embraced by the masses.65 As a result, blogs
Berners-Lee developed a browser/editor program and coined the name World Wide Web
as the name of the program. Id. In recent years, the information superhighway has had a
profound effect on nearly every aspect of our lives—it is an essential tool for families to
keep in touch, for consumers, and for individuals to inform themselves on news and areas
of interest. The Internet allows people to “meet, and talk, and live in cyberspace in ways
not possible in real space.” Laurence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1745–
46 (1995) (“What will be new are the communities that this space will allow, and the
constructive . . . possibilities that these communities will bring.”).
63
See generally David Kline & Dan Burstein, BLOG! HOW THE NEWEST MEDIA
REVOLUTION IS CHANGING POLITICS, BUSINESS, AND CULTURE (CDS Books 2005). See also
Amy Gahran, E-Media Tidebits Editor, Poynter Online, On Facing the Heat,
http://www.poynter.org/dg.lts/id.31/aid.91283/column.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
Offering gripes regarding websites without a commenting feature, the author notes:
People who start a blog and don’t have a commenting function -- I just
think they’re cowards. I mean, if you’re going to be out there, you’ve
got to have a real blog. Everybody else does! It’s kind of pathetic to be
a professional journalist and feel like you can’t handle the heat. All
those amateurs out there allow comments, and that’s what makes a
blog really interesting, because it’s a conversation.
Id. (quoting Carl Zimmer, http://www.corante.com/loom).
64
See Computer Dictionary, “Weblog”, http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/w/
weblog.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2007). The site provides a brief explanation of weblogs, or
blogs:
A weblog, or blog, is a listing of text, images, and/or other objects that
are arranged in a chronological order that first started appearing in
1998. Blogs are often maintained and run by a single individual,
updated daily, and/or contain random personal remarks about a topic,
a personal ramble, an update on the person’s life and/or their current
feelings. In many ways, many weblogs are like a personal journal,
diary or a look into another individual’s life and can be a great way to
learn about people, events, places, and much more from millions of
people around the world.
Some examples of software and services that users use to create and
start their own weblogs are Blogger, Manila, Movable Type, MySpace,
LiveJournal, Radio Userland, and TypePad.
Id.
65
See Jeffrey M. Schlossberg & Kimberly B. Malerba, Outside Counsel: Employer
Regulation of Blogging, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 4:
While originally blogs were used by the technically savvy, blogs
are now being used by the masses as a type of electronic diary where
people can post their thoughts on everything from politics and life in
general[] . . . . The difference between a blog and a diary, however, is
that anyone with access to the Internet can read, copy, e-mail or print
the blog entries.
Id.; see also supra Kline, note 63.
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have become a very influential component on the Internet. Blogs have
become news sources, methods to memorialize thoughts and reactions to
news, tools for creating online communities based upon similar interests,
and, more recently, have played a large part in political debates.66
Today, online communities have reached their pinnacle with the rise
of Facebook and other social networking sites.67 The new online
community allows users to merge their real identity with their virtual
identity by providing an interactive, image-laden directory of former
and current classmates who share similar lifestyles and interests.68 Some
analysts note that the new Facebook generation has allowed the Internet
to grow up.69 Under the old regime, the idea seemed to be that the
Internet allowed users to escape their real identity and re-invent
themselves without public scorn or Internet oversight; thus, users sought
freedom from the social burdens and stigma of real life.70 By contrast,
66
See Alexa Web Search, United States—Alexa Top 100 Sites, http://www.alexa.com/
site/ds/top_sites?cc=US&ts_mode=country&lang=none (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
67
See Facebook, About Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/facebook (showing one of
today’s online communities) (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
68
Id. “Facebook gives people the power to share and makes the world more open and
connected. Millions of people use Facebook everyday to keep up with friends, upload an
unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more about the people they
meet.” Id. The Facebook website allows its users to create profiles, complete with personal
information, interests, and photos. Id. In addition, the site allows users to exchange
messages, both private and public, and to join interest groups. Id. Facebook boasts
upwards of 46 million users, with an additional 200,000 users signing up daily since
January 2007. Facebook, Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
(last visited Oct. 8, 2007). Perhaps even more startlingly, more than half the users of the
website use it daily, spending on average 20 minutes a day and uploading more than 14
million pictures. Id.
69
Lev Grossman, Why Facebook Is the Future, TIME, Aug. 23, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1655722,00.html.
This
article
contrasts popular technological advancements on the Internet and concludes that:
Whereas Google is a brilliant technological hack, Facebook is primarily
a feat of social engineering. (It wouldn’t be a bad idea for Google to
acquire Facebook, the way it snaffled YouTube, but it’s almost
certainly too late in the day for that. Yahoo! offered a billion for
Facebook last year and was rebuffed.) Facebook’s appeal is both
obvious and rather subtle. It’s a website, but in a sense, it’s another
version of the Internet itself: a Net within the Net, one that’s
everything the larger Net is not.
Id.
70
Id. Thus, the lure of secrecy on the net is dwindling as the Internet is and will
continue to merge our everyday image with our online personalities until the distinction
disappears. Id. In fact, scholars note that the Internet, rather than decreasing socialability
and real world contact (as had been previously predicted) instead has increased contact by
strengthening both relationships and facilitating meetings. BARRY WELLMAN & CAROLINE
HAYTHORNTHWAITE, THE INTERNET IN EVERYDAY LIFE 82 (Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002)
(investigating how being online fits into people’s everyday lives).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 [2009], Art. 8

1282 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

today’s Internet encourages and embraces real-world identities.71 For
example, on Facebook, for the most part, people use their real names,
post pictures of themselves, and “also declare their sex, age,
whereabouts, romantic status and institutional affiliations.”72 However,
the emergence of blogging and social networking as a replacement to
online anonymity has brought a range of legal liabilities and other
unforeseen consequences.73 As a result, the legislatures and the courts
are charged with developing and interpreting the law in relation to this
newly formed medium.74
B. Early Attempts to Regulate the World Wide Web
This Part briefly describes early attempts by the courts, and later by
Congress, to regulate the seemingly boundary-less Internet. First, Part
II.B.1 briefly explores attempts by the judiciary to impose liability for
wrongs that occurred in cyberspace and the ensuing inconsistency that
followed. Second, Part II.B.2 examines Congress’s regulatory changes
that sought to clear up judicially created inconsistencies.
1.

Pre-Communications Decency Act: The Split of Authority in the
Early Years

In the early 1990s, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York undertook cyber-libel as a question of first
impression.75 In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., the district court
interpreted the role of CompuServe as an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
as merely a passive conduit for expressive activity.76 Thus, the district
See supra note 68 (describing one of the most popular social networking communities).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text. See also KAREL M. BALOUN, INSIDE
FACEBOOK: LIFE, WORK AND VISIONS OF GREATNESS 7 (Karel Baloun 2006). The book briefly
describes the Facebook environment:
Facebook is No. 1 in the amount of time spent on-site by visiting users.
Think about that. A site that didn’t even exist three years ago is the
place on the Internet where visiting users spend more time than on any
other site. Facebook is the most important site for folks in college.
Facebook is the most successful privately held, closed social network.
Facebook is also a first job for many of the people who work there, and
a once-in-a-lifetime experience for everyone else.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
73
See supra note 68 (discussing how the communication environment established by
Facebook creates ample opportunity for defamation on the Internet as users are
encouraged to use the site to post pictures and messages to other users on the network).
74
See infra Part II.B (discussing early attempts to regulate the Internet).
75
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
76
Id. at 141. The district court applied a three-prong test to determine CompuServe’s
liability for defamation to determine: (1) whether the company was a publisher or
71
72
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court held that CompuServe could not be held liable under traditional
defamation principles as a distributor because it completely lacked
editorial control.77
Four years later, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,78 the
New York Supreme Court entered a judgment that sparked far more
controversy than its predecessor, Cubby, Inc.79 In Stratton Oakmont, an
investment firm sued Prodigy, an ISP, for defamatory messages posted
by third-party subscribers of Prodigy’s web services, in particular, the
Money Talk bulletin board.80 Contrary to the decision in Cubby, Inc., the
distributor; (2) the extent of editorial control, if any; and (3) whether there is an affirmative
showing that CompuServe knew or should have known the defamatory nature of the
comments posted to the discussion boards. Id. at 139–41.
77
Id. The district court noted that
[w]ith respect to the Rumorville publication, the undisputed facts are
that DFA uploads the text of Rumorville into CompuServe’s data
banks and makes it available to approved CIS subscribers
instantaneously. CompuServe has no more editorial control over such
a publication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand, and
it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every
publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it
would be for any other distributor to do so. “First Amendment
guarantees have long been recognized as protecting distributors of
publications . . . . Obviously, the national distributor of hundreds of
periodicals has no duty to monitor each issue of every periodical it
distributes. Such a rule would be an impermissible burden on the First
Amendment.”
Id. at 140 (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied
471 U.S. 1054) (footnote omitted) (ellipsis in original); see also Daniel v. Dow Jones &
Co.,520 N.Y.S.2d 334, 340 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987) (holding that computerized database service
“is one of the modern, technologically interesting, alternative ways the public may obtain
up-to-the-minute news[]” and “is entitled to the same protection as more established
means of news distribution[]”).
78
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, (“CDA”) 47 U.S.C. § 230
(2000).
79
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
80
Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *1. The Money Talk bulletin board was a
financial information bulletin board with strong readership on which subscribers posted
defamatory comments about Stratton Oakmont, Inc.’s fraudulent business practices. Id. at
*1–2. The statements posted to the Money Talk bulletin board stated:
(a) STRATTON OAKMONT, INC. (“STRATTON”), a securities
investment banking firm, and DANIEL PORUSH, STRATTON’s
president, committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with
the initial public offering of stock of Solomon-Page Ltd.;
(b) the Solomon-Page offering was a “major criminal fraud” and “100%
criminal fraud”;
(c) PORUSH was “soon to be proven criminal”; and,
(d) STRATTON was a “cult of brokers who either lie for a living or get
fired.”
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court held that Prodigy was liable for postings on the bulletin board due
to its decision to retain the ability to delete and otherwise manipulate
user postings, likely a result of its desire to attract a market of users
seeking a “family oriented” computer service.81
In part, the resulting inconsistency in the precedent regarding ISP
liability led to greater speech protection for ISPs under the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA” or “section 230” or “the
Act”).82
2.

Post-CDA: The After-Effects of Congress’s Regulation

The Stratton Oakmont and Cubby decisions created an interesting
paradox: on the one hand, a message board operator could abstain from
maintaining editorial control and avoid liability as a passive conduit of
information;83 on the other hand, any attempt to edit and control user
content may have the potential consequence of added liability.84
At the time the Stratton Oakmont decision came down in 1995,
Congress was considering an overhaul of the Communications Act of
1934.85 The new Telecommunications Act of 1996 proposed a massive

Id. at *1. Stratton sued Prodigy for one hundred million dollars in compensatory damages
and another one hundred million dollars for punitive damages. Id.
81
Id. at *4–5. “PRODIGY’s conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control, has
opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer networks that
make no such choice.” Id. The court determined in Stratton that Prodigy effectively
regulated the content and acted more as a publisher by retaining the ability to exhibit
editorial control over the content. Id. at *3; cf. Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140 (noting that
CompuServe acted as a distributor, in that it collected a fee to set-up an online forum for its
subscribers after which it retained no editorial control over the content).
82
47 U.S.C. § 230. The CDA was included in Title V of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 and focused primarily on reducing regulation and promoting competition in local
telephone and broadcast markets. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 501, 110 Stat. 56, 133 (1996). The proposal was accepted by a vote of 84 to 16.
Communications—Telecommunications—Child
shield/obscene
telecommunications
amendment, CONG. INDEX 1995–1996 23,027 (June 14, 1995). On February 8, 1996, just days
after the CDA’s passage into law, the usually vibrant and colorful world of cyberspace
turned black as hundreds of website hosts blackened their websites for forty-eight hours in
protest of the enactment of the CDA. See Mike Snider, Cyber Protest Planned Over Telecom
Bill, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 1996, at A1; see also Jeff Frentzen, The CDA in review: silencing the
whiners, PC WEEK, Aug. 30, 1997, at 181 (discussing the “Black Thursday” protest).
83
See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 141 (the court held that ISPs are merely a passive
conduit and, as such, cannot be subject to liability for any failure to edit content).
84
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710 at *1 (setting the precedent that ISPs who
perform editorial controls would be subject to liability).
85
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). The Communications Act of 1934 re-dubbed the Federal Radio
Commission as the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). Id. (describing the
purposes of this chapter). In addition, it transferred the regulation of telephone services
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deregulation of broadcast media, the first of its kind in nearly sixty-two
years.86 However, hidden beneath the surface of the Act were several
additional provisions related to the regulation of the untamed Internet
that effectively overruled Stratton Oakmont.87
The advent of the CDA accomplished two of Congress’s primary
goals.88 First, it was an attempt to regulate pornography and obscenity
on the Internet to protect children.89 Second, section 230 of the Act,
arguably the most controversial in recent years, declared that operators
and users of Internet services could not be held liable for the remarks of
third parties who use their services.90
The CDA quickly met its first opposition in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in ACLU v. Reno,91 and
under careful scrutiny, the district court invalidated key provisions of
the CDA.92 This issue was brought before the United States Supreme
under the FCC umbrella; formerly the Interstate Commerce Commission regulated
telephone services. Id.
86
47 U.S.C. § 230. This attempt at regulation met stark opposition with other proposed
systems of Internet regulation. See Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. Rosenthal:
Defamation Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 485–88
(2004) (discussing a traditional law approach to regulation); Johnson & Post, supra note 31,
at 1367 (discussing the development of cyberlaws); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of
Independence in Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUNDATION, Feb. 8, 1996,
http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (discussing Internet autonomy and
self-regulation).
87
47 U.S.C. § 230; see David E. Loundy, E-LAW: Computer Information Systems Law and
System Operator Liability, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1075, 1089–90 (1998) (discussion of the
CDA’s safe harbor provision and its relationship to Stratton Oakmont).
88
Loundy, supra note 87, at 1084, 1102 (noting the purposes related to both content
regulation, which were later ruled unconstitutional, and liability for Internet service
providers and users).
89
141 CONG. REC. S8088-89 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). Senator
James Exon (Democrat – Nebraska) introducted the CDA on February 1, 1995. 141 CONG.
REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995). He stated, “the information superhighway should not
become a red light district. This legislation will keep that from happening and extend the
standards of decency which have protected telephone users to new telecommunications
devices.” Id. The bill served as an amendment to section 230 of Title 47 of the United
States Code entitled “[o]bscene or harassing telephone calls in the District of Columbia or
in interstate or foreign communications.” 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
90
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). The House Conference Report
states that “[o]ne of the specific purposes of [section 230] is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v.
Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as
publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access
to objectionable material.” Id.
91
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
92
Id. at 849. Almost immediately after lawmakers signed the CDA into law, the ACLU
and numerous other organizations brought this action seeking a preliminary injunction
and raising a facial constitutional challenge to the provisions of the CDA. Id. at 826–27.
The district court conducted extensive fact-finding, no fewer than nineteen pages of text,
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Court and, later the same month, in Reno v. ACLU,93 the Court upheld
the decision of the district court.94 The Supreme Court analyzed the
CDA’s provisions criminalizing the knowing transmission of obscene or
indecent material, and in particular, the regulation of indecent messages to
persons under the age of eighteen, and concluded that the provisions
lacked the precision required by the First Amendment.95 Thus, the Court
struck down the law as an unconstitutionally overbroad infringement on
the First Amendment, despite the government’s asserted interest in
protecting children from indecency.96
cataloging the inner workings of computers in cyberspace. Id. at 830–49. The district court
rejected any attempt by the Government, collectively Janet Reno, the Attorney General of
the United States, and the United States Department of Justice, to use the term “indecent”
in the statute with the Court’s earlier analysis of the term in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726, 739–40 (1978). Id. In Pacifica, the Court held that George Carlin’s “Filthy Words”
broadcast, though it was not obscene, was indecent, and given the compelling interest in
the protection of child audiences and privacy interests of shielding unwanted speech from
the home was subject to restriction. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–51. Thus, the Court for the first
time upheld a regulation to the on-air, free, broadcast media. Id. at 762.
93
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (declaring the prohibition of indecent communication over the
Internet unconstitutional).
94
Id.
The breadth of the CDA’s coverage is wholly unprecedented. . . . [T]he
scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial
entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and
individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their
own computers in the presence of minors. The general, undefined
terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” cover large amounts of
nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value.
Id. at 877.
95
Id. at 846. Despite Congress’s narrowing attempts to protect children from
pornography on the Internet, the Court reached the same result in its analysis of the Child
Online Protection Act (“COPA”) in Ashcroft v. ACLU. 542 U.S. 656 (2001). Under COPA,
Congress narrowed the reach of its prior attempts to protect children from exposure to
indecent material on the Internet. Id. at 668–69 (in previous challenges to the use of filters
in the Supreme Court Congress’s attempts to mandate the use of filters did not pass strict
scrutiny). Unlike filters the new COPA legislation would penalize communications posted
for commercial purposes which contained material harmful to minors. Id. at 661; see also 47
U.S.C. § 231 (the amended COPA statute applies only to communication for commercial
purposes). Therefore, COPA did not prohibit indecent material on the Internet, but merely
required commercial website owners to take reasonable steps to bar children from their
site. Id. at 668–69. The Court did not hold that the statute was overbroad even though it
relied on community standards to determine “material that is harmful to minors[,]” rather
it held that on this record the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
the statute was unconstitutional, however, the Court remanded to determine if less
restrictive alternatives existed to further the government’s objective. Id. at 672–73.
96
Reno, 521 U.S. at 885. The Government’s interest in preventing potentially harmful
communication from reaching children is unpersuasive as it in turn suppresses vast
amounts of speech that adults have a First Amendment right to transmit and receive. Id.
The breadth of the statute is too large given that there was no assertion by the Government
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The second, and more recent, CDA-sparked controversy concerned
the immunity from liability granted to both ISPs and third-party users
under section 230(c)(1).97 Section 230’s grant of immunity to ISPs was
quickly confirmed by the court in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.98 The
Zeran court rejected the challenge to ISP immunity and cited Congress’s
apparent rationale for granting the favored immunity: “[T]o maintain
the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly,” to keep
ISPs from imposing “severe[] restrict[ions on] the number and type of
messages posted[]” out of fear of liability.99 In 1998, Blumenthal v.
Drudge100 extended Zeran, and the court held that even ISPs who pay
that less restrictive alternatives did not exist. Id. at 879. Perhaps the most significant aspect
of the Court’s decision in Reno is its willingness to apply traditional First Amendment
precedent to a new medium. Id. 864–68.
97
See 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1). “No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” Id. See also Andrea L. Julian, Comment, Freedom of Libel: How an
Expansive Interpretation of 47 U.S.C. § 230 Affects the Defamation Victim in the Ninth Circuit, 40
IDAHO L. REV. 509, 523–24 (2004) (discussing the controversey over the potential for selfregulating ISPs to be assigned defamation liability while creating a liability free pass for
ISPs who do not).
98
129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). In Zeran, a user posted a message to an America
Online bulletin board that advertised the sale of t-shirts that “featur[ed] offensive and
tasteless slogans related to the April 19, 1995, bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City.” Id. at 329.
99
Id. at 330, 331. The court noted:
Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that
would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus,
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a
publisher's traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether
to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.
Id. at 330.
100
992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). In Blumenthal v. Drudge, the plaintiff Blumenthal was a
high-ranking Clinton aide. Id. at 46. The defendant, Matt Drudge, is the writer and
publisher of the Drudge Report, a website devoted to conservative political news, opinion,
and gossip. Id. at 47. In addition to his own website, Drudge also published stories via
AOL, an online service provider and defendant in this matter. Id. In the instant case,
Drudge published a story about Blumenthal which quoted an anonymous source as
disclosing allegations that Blumenthal abused his spouse. Id. at 46. As a result, the
Blumenthals filed a Complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that
demanded $30,000,001.00 in damages. See Plaintiff’s Compl. ¶ 273. The court took up the
issue of AOL’s liability for defamatory statements posted to their website, and concluded
AOL should be dismissed from the lawsuit pursuant to the immunity from liability granted
by the CDA. Id. at 53. However, the majority noted its discomfort with this result, and
further discussed the purpose behind Congress’s enactment of the CDA, which it had no
choice but to follow in the instant case:
If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with
plaintiffs. AOL has certain editorial rights with respect to the content
provided by Drudge and disseminated by AOL, including the right to
require changes in content and to remove it; and it has affirmatively
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members for posting certain content are immune from any tort liability
derived from the posting.101 In 2006, another court decided Barrett v.
Rosenthal,102 and it too relied upon Zeran, holding that until Congress
decides to revisit the issue, ISPs are immune.103 Thus, many defamed
plaintiffs are restricted to recovery only against the original source, not
merely for a user’s republished version of the same defamatory
material.104
Although the Zeran, Blumenthal, and Barrett cases exhibit an
understanding of Congress’s attempt to suppress the potential chilling
effects of speech on the Internet that would result from ISP liability for
member postings, these rulings have also affirmed that there is little
recourse for Internet libel victims, at least those seeking the deep pockets
of Internet ISPs.105 At present, neither ISPs nor anonymous posters are
subject to liability for defamatory statements.106 However, while section
230 may frustrate the ability of individuals and businesses that seek to
promoted Drudge as a new source of unverified instant gossip on
AOL. . . . But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing
immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active,
even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.
In some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider
community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an
incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for
obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is
unsuccessful or not even attempted.
Id. at 51–52.
101
Id. at 51–52 (briefly discussing the Zeran opinion).
102
146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
103
Id. at 529. Briefly, the facts of this opinion reveal that Bolen sent an e-mail
correspondence to Rosenthal that was alleged to be defamatory. Id. at 513–14. Then,
Rosenthal copied the e-mail received from Bolan to two separate newsgroups. Id. at 514.
Rosenthal then defended the suit under section 230 immunity. Id. at 513. The trial court
granted the motion to dismiss in light of Rosenthal’s purported section 230 immunity. Id.
at 514. On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed. Id. The California Supreme
Court then interpreted the immunity provision of section 230 as also applying to individual
users of Internet services and did not acknowledge an exception for distributor liability. Id.
at 514. The court concluded, “Congress has comprehensively immunized republication by
individual Internet users.” Id. at 529. The term user, defined as any person or entity that
uses an interactive computer service, establishes that there is no basis to distinguish
between active and passive Internet use; all Internet users are immune. Id.
104
Id. at 529 (“Plaintiffs are free under section 230 to pursue the originator of a
defamatory Internet publication.
Any further expansion of liability must await
Congressional action.”).
105
See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text (describing immunity granted ISPs); see
also Eric P. Robinson, Staff Attorney, Media Law Resource Center, Legal Actions and
Developments Involving Blogs (Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.medialaw.org/
bloggerlawsuits (collecting cases).
106
See supra notes 100, 103 and accompanying text (describing immunity granted ISPs
and users of Internet services).
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put a stop to damaging Internet posts, it has not entirely foreclosed the
ability of plaintiffs to file defamation actions.107
As a whole, the aforementioned cases provide a very broad grant of
immunity for ISPs and third party users of their services.108 Although
the Zeran-Blumenthal-Barrett line of cases provides strong support for the
continued expansion of immunity, it leaves open liability for the original
source.109 While this virtual immunity ends almost all concern for large
companies and third party users, it does not remove the very real threat
of monetary injury that plagues bloggers, Facebook friends, and other
denizens of this new Internet.110
C. The Background and History of Defamation Law and Retraction Strategy
This Part briefly describes the history of defamation to build a
framework for analyzing the problems created through the application
of defamation law to the new Internet medium.111 First, Part II.C
examines the history and development of defamation law by examining
common law principles to form a basic framework of defamation law
and retraction strategy.112 Next, Part II.C highlights judicial attempts to
resolve Internet defamation suits under the old framework.113 This Part
endeavors to highlight many of the most important Internet cases to
date, to describe the legal climate of defamation law on the Internet, to
bring to light current issues related to defamation liability on the
Internet, and to lay the groundwork for examining workable future
solutions.114

107
Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529 (Cal. 2006). The Barrett court based their opinion upon the fact
that the defendant did not have any supervisory role in the Internet site, nor was the
defendant the original source of the allegedly defamatory material; nonetheless, the court
held that the plaintiffs were free under section 230 to pursue the originator of the Internet
publication. Id.
108
See supra notes 95–104 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the CDA and
the immunity created for ISPs under corresponding case law).
109
See, e.g., Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529 (upholding the CDA’s grant of immunity to ISPs).
110
See supra notes 95–97 (discussing the immunity granted ISPs, but withheld from the
original source).
111
See infra Part II.C (discussing problems with applying traditional defamation law
principles to the Internet).
112
Infra Part II.C.1 (discussing defamation law at the common law).
113
Infra Part II.C.2 (discussing a retraction strategy used to mitigate damages at the
common law).
114
Infra Part II.C (discussing preeminent case law as it relates to defamation and the
Internet).
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History and Development of the Law of Defamation

The Supreme Court has long recognized that the inherent right of an
individual to safeguard his name “reflects no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”115 In fact,
even at its inception, defamation law was a remnant of the British crime
of seditious libel that developed to allow an individual to utilize the
machinery of the courts to vindicate his good name.116
From the outset, the eighteenth century Framers of the United States
Constitution guaranteed the freedoms of press and speech by writing
these protections into the First Amendment of the Constitution.117
However, in its earlier jurisprudence, the Supreme Court refused to
protect the media from defamation lawsuits by relying on the guarantees
of the First Amendment.118 Instead, defamation law varied from state to
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J. concurring); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Cooke ed. 1961) (“It is of great importance in a
republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one
part of the society against the injustice of the other part.”).
116
See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, America on Trial: The Cases that Define Our History 4248 (Warner Books 2004) (citing JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND
TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER 6–7 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., Cambridge: the Belknap Press of
Harvard Univ. Press) (1963)). Perhaps one of the most famous American defamation cases
occurred in 1734, wherein Zenger, an American newspaperman, was charged by the British
Crown with the crime of seditious libel for mocking the Royal Governor, a widely detested
man named Cosby, in the New York Weekly Journal. Id. Also of importance in Zenger’s case,
was the establishment of truth as an absolute defense in defamation actions. Id. at 45–46.
(the judge ruled that truth could not be a defense to libel but counsel eloquently persuaded
the jury that this was the right result) Presumably, until Zenger’s case, it had never
mattered much whether the allegedly libelous statements about someone were true or
false. Id. Since the Zenger case and a series of debates on the issue, a person can sue
successfully for libel only if the defamatory information is proven to be false. Id. at 48.
117
U.S. CONST. amend. I. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” Id.
118
See 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 349–50 (1956). The law of defamation
did not historically include the principles of free speech and press. Id. Instead, defamation
dealt with the generalized abuses of those rights and with injury to one’s reputation. Id.
While the law among the states varied, in the most general sense whenever one person
communicated information that injured another’s reputation often to incite hatred,
contempt, ridicule, to otherwise deprive another of respect or cause him to be shunned by
others, the party defamed had a cause of action against the defamer. See ROBERT MCEWEN
& PHILIP LEWIS, GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 14–15 (7th ed. Sweet and Maxwell Limited
1974) (1924). To prove defamation, the plaintiff bore the burden to show only that his
reputation had been impaired in the eyes of a substantial number of respected community
members. HARPER & JAMES, supra, at 350; see also Kimmerle v. N.Y. Evening Journal, 186
N.E. 217, 217 (N.Y. 1933) (describing strict liability for defamation, “[t]he law of defamation
115
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state without the benefit of a single cohesive rule throughout the
nation.119
It was not until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan120 that the Supreme
Court acted upon the inconsistencies of developing defamation law by
issuing a ruling that recovery for defamation be limited by the First
Amendment; in short, this proposition revolutionized defamation law in
the United States.121 The significance of Sullivan rests in the Court’s
decision to square defamation law more fully with the freedoms of press
and expression guaranteed by the First Amendment.122 However, the
Court warned that these protections are not absolute.123 Moreover, the
is concerned only with injuries to one’s reputation[]”). However, courts soon realized that
although protecting individuals’ interest in their reputation was important, it must be
balanced against the important ideals of self-government, for “[w]hatever is added to the
field of libel is taken from the field of free debate.” Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
119
RICHARD LUBUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: LEGAL HISTORY AND PRACTICE
IN PRINT AND BROADCASTING 54 (Transaction Books 1987). “The laws varied not only from
state to state, but often from case to case within the same state.” Id.
120
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
121
Id. at 265–92. (the court determined that states cannot award damages to public
officials for falsehoods under the First and Fourteenth Amendments without proof of
“actual malice”). In Sullivan, the Supreme Court faced the challenge of balancing the
protection of reputation, the principle of defamation law, against the protection of
expression. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1008 (Aspen Publishers 2002). The facts of the case provided that the New York Times ran a
full-page advertisement entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices,” produced by a group of black
clergyman in support of the Negro right-to-vote movement and Negro Student movement.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. Sullivan, the plaintiff and police chief of Montgomery, Alabama,
brought a defamation suit against the New York Times for the advertisement. Id. He alleged
the newspaper’s advertisement made false accusations that he had harassed black activists.
Id. at 258. The Supreme Court held that tort liability recovery for defamation—both libel
and slander—despite its falsity, is limited by the First Amendment. Id. at 269. An
additional burden rests upon plaintiffs to cure the balance of interests that requires proof
the defendant acted with actual malice in printing the defamatory material. Id. at 279–80.
The Court justified this burden by explaining that defamation is protected speech not fully
immune from liability. Id. at 269. In short, the Court stated, “libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy
the First Amendment.” Id.
122
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1008. The author notes the Supreme Court
has identified several categories of speech that are either unprotected or less protected by
the First Amendment. Id. at 952–53. In these instances the justifications for regulating the
speech are overshadowed by the value of the expression. Id. at 953. The unprotected
categories of speech include defamation, incitement of illegal activity, fighting words, and
obscenity. Id. at 952–53. Two examples of less protected, or low-value speech, are
commercial speech and sexually-oriented speech. Id. at 953.
123
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,
245–46 (2000) (placing emphasis on free speech limitations; for example, the First
Amendment guarantees do not protect defamation, incitement, obscenity or pornography);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (“[T]he great principles of the Constitution
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Court concluded that additional limitations and exceptions would be
necessary to strike a balance between protecting reputation and
safeguarding First Amendment guarantees.124
From its humble beginnings, the law of defamation began to flourish
as the courts imposed exceptions, crafted definitions, and invoked
certain privileges.125 Today, these early privileges and exceptions have
carried over to the emerging broadcast mediums of television and radio,
wherein a libelous broadcast has traditionally been treated as an original
publication made by the network or broadcast publisher.126 As a result,
under Sullivan and the Court’s subsequent limitations, defamation

which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences
to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood.”).
124
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1008 (“Since New York Times, the Supreme
Court has attempted to strike this balance by developing a complex series of rules that
depend on the identity of the plaintiff and the nature of the subject matter.”).
125
Id. at 952 (Chermerinsky inquires as to whether the categorical definitions and
exceptions developed by the Court are sufficiently specific). Many of these exceptions,
while important to the law of defamation, are irrelevant for the purposes of this Note;
nonetheless, it is worth brief mention that “public figure[s]” have traditionally faced a
higher burden in defamation suits than “limited purpose public figure[s]” or “private
figure[s].” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1015. Sullivan is the preeminent case for the
“public figure” distinction. Id. at 1008. The issue in Sullivan grew out of a split of authority
between the states on whether public officials were required to prove actual malice prior to
any recovery. See E.B. Morris, Annotation, Doctrine of privilege or fair comment as applicable to
misstatements of fact in publication (or oral communication) relating to public officer or candidate
for office, 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937). The majority of states permitted recovery absent malice. Id.
at 412–35 (collecting cases). However, a small majority of states disallowed recovery
without proof of malice. Id. at 435–41 (collecting cases). The minority position laid the
groundwork for the future of defamation law, including the Court’s revolutionary decision
in Sullivan. Id. Post-Sullivan, an elected official or public figure must prove actual malice
on the part of the speaker by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 412–35. However, for
private persons not thrusting themselves into the sphere of public debate the standard is
lower, and as in the past is set by various state laws, but cannot be strict liability. See Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–45 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 375, 391 (1967).
In addition, a defamatory statement must not be a mere expression of opinion; rather, it
must be factual in nature or give rise to a factual inference. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1990). Later, exceptions to this general framework were created. See
Morris, supra note 125, at 435–41. For example, at common law a person committed libel
each time a defamatory statement was reproduced, meaning either repeated or
republished, and that person would be subject to the same degree of liability as the first
publisher. Id. Moreover, distributors of written material such as news stands, bookstores,
and libraries would be found liable only if they knew or had reason to know that the
content was defamatory. Id. Thus, a publisher might be held liable for defamation at the
common law for unknowingly publishing defamatory material; however, the distributor
will not be liable unless it knew or had reason to know of untruths in the publication. Id.
126
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 121, at 1008.
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remains the primary remedy against communication excesses in verbal,
print, and electronic media.127
2.

Prudent Defenses to Defamation Actions—Retraction Statute
Applicability

The common law doctrine of unavoidable consequences allows a
publisher the opportunity to mitigate its damages by submitting to a
retraction request.128 Under this doctrine, defamatory action is weighed
against the ability of the victim to avoid or mitigate the harmful effects
and the gravity of the consequences.129 Consistent with similar damages
principles in tort law, this doctrine places the burden upon the plaintiff
in a defamation action to “use such means as are reasonable under the
circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages.”130
Practically speaking, the doctrine of unavoidable consequences
works to protect both publishers and their victims by requiring a fair
rebuttal and retraction of the defamatory content.131 In effect, the
doctrine can be both a means of providing restoration of the injured
party’s reputation and an effective means to mitigate damages caused by
defendants.132 In this sense, retraction is the most effective means for
Id. (noting that the principles of defamation law combined with retraction strategy
have the potential to provide for reputational repairs through damages and the correction
of the defamatory statement).
128
DEFAMATION: LIBEL AND SLANDER 84 (Theodore R. Kupferman ed., Mecklermedia
1990). Retraction originated in a New York case wherein the “court held that a retraction
afforded ‘proof not only of a disposition to repair the wrong afflicted, but of actual
reparation to some extent.’” Id. (citations omitted). Retraction is a strong defense to
defamation due to its ability to correct the error by presenting the truth, and thereby
“showing that plaintiff’s reputation suffered less than claimed.” Id. (citation omitted).
129
Donna M. Murasky, Avoidable Consequences in Defamation: The Common Law Duty to
Request Retraction, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 167, 174 (1987–88).
130
C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 127 (1935). See also PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 65, at 458 (Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (noting that the doctrine rests upon the
“fundamental policy of making recovery depend upon the plaintiff’s proper care for the
protection of his own interests[]”). Thus, failure by the plaintiff to request a timely
retraction of the defamatory publication may result in loss of recovery “to the extent that it
has been increased by his own unreasonable acts or by his failure to take active steps to
minimize the loss so long as unreasonable expense or exertion would not be involved.” Id.
McCormick, supra, at 130.
131
Murasky, supra note 129, at 175–76.
132
Id; see also Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002), rev’g, 556 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001) (statute provides that plaintiff in libel action shall not be entitled to any punitive
damages if defendant corrects and retracts libelous statement, and as a result, all libel
plaintiffs who intend to seek punitive damages must request retraction or correction before
filing civil action); Hucko v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 302 N.W.2d 68, 73–74 (Wis. Ct. App.
1981). Although some defamation statutes merely codify the common law in providing
retraction as a mitigating circumstance, others seek to eliminate or condition an award of
127
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remedying injury caused by defamatory publication at the earliest
opportunity.133 Thus, though often under-asserted, the doctrine of
retraction remains in effect today, and one need look no further than her
daily paper to view the practical effects of this principle.134
Today, most retraction statutes relate only to defamatory statements
published in the broadcast or print media.135 In fact, thirty-one states

damages recovered by a defamed plaintiff. Hucko, 302 N.W.2d at 73. In fact, retractions are
often legislatively awarded. Id. The motivation for this enhancement of retractions rests
not only in the efforts to protect the First Amendment rights of the defendant but also in
the belief that frequently the best remedy for the defamed plaintiff may be a timely
correction or retraction of the libelous material. Id. at 73 n.5.
133
Murasky, supra note 129, at 175–76.
134
E.g., James Barron, Need Case: Just Auction Off a Meteorite, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2007, at
B3. The New York Times retracted, stating:
The article did not adequately emphasize Mr. Pitt’s considerable
experience in the handling, study and sale of meteorites, or his
sensitivity to the concerns of the Grand Ronde. The article should
have made clear that he was not interested merely in money but also in
acquiring other extraterrestrial objects, and that his awareness of the
feelings of the Indians was the reason he had been uneasy about being
photographed.
Id. See generally Craig Silverman, REGRET THE ERROR, http://www.regrettheerror.com/
(last visited Oct. 11, 2007) (tracking corrections and retractions in newspapers, magazines,
broadcast media, and online media).
135
See infra note 136 (discussing the substance of state retraction statutes). However, the
courts have in limited instances broadly defined state retraction statutes to apply to the
Internet. Compare It’s In the Cards, Inc. v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 12 n.1, 14–15 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (reversing a grant of summary judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to request a
retraction prior to filing suit, as required by the retraction statute which applies to “any
libelous publication in any newspaper, magazine or periodical[,]” the court determined that
because the statute predates the Internet it did not apply to Internet postings and the
legislature must address the growing problems of Internet libel) (emphasis omitted), with
Mathis, 573 S.E.2d at 385 (stating that a statute which purported to apply to newspapers
and print media also applied to Internet postings). The Georgia Supreme Court, in Mathis,
departed from the plain language interpretation performed by the appellate court, wherein
the court stated:
Following the plain language of these statutory provisions, they would
not appear to be applicable to Internet postings.
First, they
contemplate actions between an aggrieved party and a newspaper,
television station, or radio station. They do not appear to address
actions between two individuals. Second, these statutes do not reach
Internet media such as chat rooms. The statutes, to the contrary,
address media which broadcast programs at specific times to specific
audiences, whereby a retraction would likely be heard by the same
audience hearing the original defamatory remarks. To the contrary,
the audience in a chat room is in a constant state of flux, making the
remedy envisioned by OCGA § 51-5-12 inapplicable. Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in finding that these statutes did not preclude
Cannon’s claim for punitive damages.
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have enacted statutes that recognize retraction, correction, or apology for
defamatory statements as a defense in civil suits alleging defamation,
libel, or slander.136 Similar to their predecessors, retraction statutes
Mathis v. Cannon, 556 S.E.2d 172, 176 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002)
(citations omitted).
136
Retraction statutes vary considerably from state to state. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-184 to 88 (West, Westlaw through End of 2007 Reg. Sess.) (defining publications as “[m]agazines”
or “newspapers” or any publication that can be mailed through the United States post
office); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-653.01–.05 (West, Westlaw through End of the FortyEighth Legislature, First Reg. Sess. (2007)) (applies only to “libel in a newspaper or
magazine, or of a slander by radio or television broadcast”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West,
Westlaw through Ch. 256 of 2007 Reg. Sess. urgency legislation) (libel defined as “an[]
action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper, or of a slander by radio
broadcast”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-237 (West, Westlaw through the 2007 Jan. Reg. Sess.
and public acts from the June Sp. Sess. approved by the Gov. on or before June 29, 2007);
FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 322 (End) of the 2007 First Reg. Sess.
and Special B Sess. of the Twentieth Legislature) (applies to newspaper and broadcast
media); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2007 Reg. Sess.) (plain
language of the statute applies only to printed and broadcast media); IDAHO CODE 6-712
(West, Westlaw through the 2007 First Reg. Sess. of the 59th Legislature, Ch. 369)
(newspaper, radio or television broadcasts); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-15-3-3 (West, Westlaw
through end of 2007 1st Reg. Sess.) (newspapers, radio, and television); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 659.2, 659.3, and 659.5 (West, Westlaw through Acts of the 2007 1st Reg. Sess.)
(“newspaper, free newspaper or shopping guide, or for defamatory statements made on a
radio or television station”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.051, .060–.061 (West, Westlaw
through end of 2007 legislation) (newspaper, magazine, periodical, radio, and television);
MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 153 (West, Westlaw with emergency legislation through Chapter
466 of the 2007 First Reg. Sess. of the 123rd Legislature); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 93
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 125 of the 2007 1st Annual Sess.) (publication); MICH . STAT.
ANN. § 600.2911 (Westlaw through P.A.2007, P.A.2007 No. 1-74, 76, 78-80, 82-84, 86, 87, 89)
(“newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication or by a radio or television
broadcast”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West, Westlaw with laws of the 2007 Reg. Sess.
effective through July 1, 2007) (newspaper); MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-1-5 (West, Westlaw
through End of the 2007 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.) (published, broadcast, telecast); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-818 to -821 (West, Westlaw through the End of 2007 Reg. Sess. and May
2007 Special Sess.) (“publication in or broadcast on any newspaper, magazine, periodical,
radio or television station, or cable television system”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-840.01 (West,
The Statutes and Constitution are Westlaw through the Second Reg. Sess. of the 99th
Legislature (2006) (any medium); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.336–.338 (West, Westlaw
through the 2005 73rd Regular Session and the 22nd Special Sess. of the Nevada
Legislature, statutory and constitutional provisions effective as a result of approval and
ratification by the voters at the November 2006 General Election, and technical corrections
received from the Legislative Counsel Bureau (2006)) (“libel in a newspaper, or of a slander
by radio or television broadcast”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:43-2 (West, Westlaw with laws
through L.2007, c. 186, and J.R. No. 11) (“newspaper, magazine, periodical, serial or other
publication in this state”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99-2 (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2007-268 of
the 2007 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-43-02 to -10 (West, Westlaw through the 2007
Reg. Sess.) (“all publications, including writings, broadcasts, oral communications,
electronic transmissions, or other forms of transmitting information”); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2739.03, 2739.13, and 2739.14 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Files 1 through 24 of
the 127th GA (2007-2008), apv. by 10/7/07, and filed with the Secretary of State by
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“allow[] a defamation plaintiff to retract, or take back, a defamatory
statement.”137 Increasingly more often, retraction statutes are effective
for many defamed individuals merely seeking to have their reputation
repaired to the extent possible and avoid costly or invasive litigation.138
Thus, in many instances, “a correction, retraction or apology is often
adequate[]” to resolve the harm to reputation caused by the defamatory
statement, when applied with some consistency.139
3.

Inconsistent Application by Courts

Although defamation law has been easily adapted from newspaper
and other forms of print media to broadcast media, the Internet has
presented difficulty in its application due in part to the many players
involved—including ISPs, hosts, and third-party users—and the everpresent jurisdictional issues that stem from networked activity.140 There
are two major cases that clearly present the issue of inconsistency in the
application of retraction statutes to online defamation.141

10/7/07) (print and broadcast media); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1446a (West, Westlaw
with chapters of the First Reg. Sess. of the 51st Legislature (2007) (effective September 1,
2007)) (“newspaper or periodical”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.210, 31.215 (West, Westlaw
through End of the 2005 Reg. Sess.) (“newspaper, magazine, other printed periodical, or by
radio, television or motion pictures”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-11-6 to -7 (West, Westlaw
through the 2007 Reg. Sess. and Supreme Court Rule 06-77) (applies to newspapers,
television, and radio not liable if one exercises due care); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-24-103 to
-104 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Reg. Sess. 2007) (newspaper, periodical, radio, and
television); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73 (West, Westlaw through the end of the
2007 Reg. Sess. of the 80th Legislature) (“expressed in written or other graphic form”);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-1 to -1.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Special Sess.)
(newspaper, radio, and television); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-48 to -49.1 (West, Westlaw
through End of 2007 Reg. Sess.) (newspaper, magazines, periodicals, radio, television, and
Internet); W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (West, Westlaw through End of 2007 Second Ex. Sess.)
(applies to written or spoken words); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 (West, Westlaw through
2007 Act 14, published 06/13/07) (newspapers).
137
First Amendment Center Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.firstamendment
center.org/Press/faqs.aspx?id=644& (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). Many statutes provide that
a plaintiff must make a request for retraction prior to a pre-determined time. Id. Then, the
defendant is given an opportunity to comply within a separate pre-determined time. Id. A
properly executed retraction statute has the effect of mitigating any damages incurred. Id.
138
RANDALL P. BEZANSON, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 50 (Free Press
1987) (1985) (reporting that three-fourths of libel litigants who were interviewed and
questioned about why they brought a lawsuit said they would have been satisfied with a
correction, retraction, or apology but indicated that they proceeded with a lawsuit because
they did not receive any of these other resolutions).
139
Id.
140
See generally supra Part II.B (discussing the legislatures’ attempts to regulate
defamatory content on the Internet).
141
See infra notes 142–54 and accompanying text.
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In the first case of Cannon v. Mathis,142 Cannon sued Mathis and, to
defend against punitive damages, Mathis alleged that Cannon’s failure
to request a retraction precluded any award of punitive damages.143
According to Mathis, the retraction statute that provided for newspapers
or other publications should be construed broadly to cover his online
142
573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002). In this Internet defamation case, Bruce Mathis, a resident of
Crisp County, made defamatory postings on an Internet message board asserting a “solid
waste recovery facility in Crisp County” was unprofitable in its operations. Id. at 377. The
solid waste recovery plant, though state-of-the-art, was never able to live up to the
expectations of the Crisp County community, and, in fact, was not able to cover its
expenses from the outset. Id. at 378. As a result, Mathis and others created a citizens’
rights group, “the Crisp Watchdogs.” Id. at 379. The advocacy groups eventually brought
about a grand jury investigation after a strong collaborative effort to ask critical questions
at commission meetings and public criticism of the waste management company’s
operations and finances. Id. Later, the grand jury recommended that the waste
management company increase the availability of information regarding their operations
and finances to the public. Id. After reading the grand jury’s report, Mathis used the
Internet to voice his opinions and posted three defamatory statements about Chris Cannon,
an officer and director of Waste Management Services, Inc. Id. Mathis’s postings, posted
under the screen name “duelly41,” stated and implied defamatory facts about Cannon, an
officer and director of Waste Management Services, Inc., a company who hauled waste to a
controversial city dump site. Id. The messages are as follows:
[F]irst message, posted at 11:14 p.m., stated:
what u doing???
by: duelly41
does wwin think they can take our county—stop the trash flow cannon
we would love u for it—our county not a dumping ground and sorry u
and lt governor are mad about it—but that is not going to float in crisp
county—so get out now u thief
The second message, posted at 11:27 p.m., stated:
cannon a crook????
by: duelly41
explain to us why us got fired from the calton company please ????
want hear your side of the story cannon!!!!!!!!
The third message, posted at 11:52 p.m., stated:
cannon a crook
by: duelly41hey cannon why u got fired from calton company???? why
does cannon and lt governor mark taylor think that crisp county needs
to be dumping ground of the south??? u be busted man crawl under a
rock and hide cannon and poole!!! if u deal with cannon u a crook
too!!!!!!! so stay out of crisp county and we thank u for it
Id.
143
Id. at 383. The court explained its decision not to award punitive damages as follows:
Applying our decision to the facts here, we find that Cannon asked the
Internet service provider Yahoo! to delete the three messages that
Mathis posted, but did not ask Mathis to correct or retract any of his
statements. Because it is undisputed that Cannon did not request a
correction or retraction in writing before filing his complaint, he is not
entitled to recover punitive damages from Mathis for any defamatory
statements posted on the bulletin board on the Internet.
Id. at 386.
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message board post.144 Fortunately for Mathis, the court agreed, finding
“[t]he practical effect of [its] decision is to require all libel plaintiffs who
intend to seek punitive damages to request a correction or retraction[,]”
in essence broadening the retraction statute and treating similar
defendants as such.145 It is unclear what amount of punitive damages
would have been recognized as a result of this off-the-cuff posting.146 It
is clear, however, that without a retraction statute, given the sheer size of
the audience that can be reached on the Internet, unlike newspapers and
other members of the press, an individual defendant like Mathis, may
have been subject to overwhelming punitive damages.147 While Mathis
survived the litigation gauntlet, others may not escape the damaging
effects of a punitive damages award.148
144

Id. at 385. Specifically, the court stated:
Our reasons for preferring this broader reading are many. This
construction makes the same word mean the same thing in all the libel
and slander code sections. It treats a publication for purposes of
seeking a retraction the same as a publication for purposes of imposing
liability. It acknowledges that the legislature extended the retraction
defense originally created for newspapers, magazines, and periodicals
to include newspapers and “other publications.” It encourages
defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by “using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.”

Id.
Id. First, the Court noted the advantage of having one reading of all the libel and
slander code sections regardless of medium. Id. Second, it acknowledged the legislative
intent to provide a retraction defense to all publications. Id. Third, and most importantly,
the court noted that the incentive retraction statutes provide for libel victims to seek selfhelp. Id. By contrast, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s expansive interpretation of
the retraction statutes. Id. at 386–87 (Hunstein, J., dissenting). The dissent honed in on the
plain language of the statute, contending that if the legislature had intended the retraction
statute to apply to the Internet it could have done so; instead, however, the legislature
limited the statutes application to defendants who publish regularly, to allow for
publication of a retraction in the next issue. Id. at 388–89. Thus, the dissent concluded that
an individual like Mathis, who posted three messages on the Internet, was incapable of
complying with the retraction statute. Id. at 389. The dissent acknowledged, however, that
the retraction statute may be applicable to an individual who regularly publishes an
Internet newspaper, magazine, or other publication. Id. In its conclusion, the dissent
stated, “the majority ruling which asks no self-censorship of an Internet poster is
unconscionable in that it allows Internet users free reign to injure the reputations of others,
even when the statements cross the bounds of propriety.” Id. at 389. The dissent would
apply defamation laws not in an effort to chill Internet speech, but rather to protect private
Internet posters, like Mathis, from an Internet that fosters the “poisonous atmosphere of the
easy lie.” Id. (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966)).
146
See id. (reversing the judgment of the lower court, holding that awarding damages
was improper).
147
See supra note 136 (noting that most state retraction statutes do not provide for
Internet publications).
148
See supra Part II.A (explaining the tremendous scope and audience of the Internet).
145
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In contrast to the facts of the Cannon case, a recent case from
Wisconsin unfortunately does not relieve any confusion for Internet
publishers.149 It’s in the Cards v. Fuschetto grew out of a series of posts on
SportsNet, an online sports memorabilia website’s bulletin board and
mailbox feature.150 In It’s in the Cards, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
was faced with determining whether the SportsNet website was a
periodical under a Wisconsin retraction statute that, like many other
state statutes, provides relief only for newspapers, magazines, or
periodicals.151 The court concluded that a SportsNet bulletin board post
is a random act of communication more closely analogous with a grocery
store bulletin board rather than a publication.152 The court specifically
noted the discourse between print and Internet publishing, finding that
“[a]pplying the present libel laws to cyberspace or computer networks
entails rewriting statutes that were written to manage physical, printed
objects, not computer networks or services.”153 Consequently, the court

149
See Electronic Freedom Foundation Bloggers’ FAQ - Online Defamation Law,
http://w2.eff.org/bloggers/lg/faq-defamation.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (“The
Bloggers’ FAQ on Online Defamation Law provides an overview of defamation (libel) law,
including a discussion of the constitutional and statutory privileges that may protect you.”)
(emphasis added).
150
535 N.W.2d 11, 12–13 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). Fuschetto, of Triple Play Collectibles, and
Meneau, of It’s In the Cards, Inc. collectibles, communicated via the SportsNet bulletin
board, as well as on the telephone. Id. at 13. During these conversations, it was agreed that
Meneau would visit Fuschetto in New York. Id. at 13. After agreeing to the visit, Fuschetto
and his wife became ill with mononucleosis. Id. Consistent with their previous
conversations, Fuschetto informed Meneau that he had become ill and asked that Meneau
postpone his trip scheduled for January 1994. Id. As a result, Fuschetto and Menau
exchanged several mailbox conversations in which they and argued about the cost of
various items that Meneau had purchased: airline tickets, tickets to a Knicks game, and
tickets to the David Letterman show. Id. While the bulk of this conversation was posted
using the more personal mailbox function of SportsNet, Fuschetto later posted a message
using the bulletin board feature, which was easily reached by all subscribers of SportsNet,
in which he discussed the arguments he had had with Meneau. Id. This led Meneau to
claim that Fuschetto had posted defamatory communications about Meneau on the bulletin
board. Id.
151
Id. at 14. In order to resolve the meaning of the term “periodical” in the absence of
any case law on point, the court consulted WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1680 (Unabr. 1976), which states that a “periodical is defined as ‘a magazine
or other publication of which the issues appear at stated or regular intervals.’” Id. The
court concluded that periodicals, based upon this definition, must appear on a regular
basis—that is, neither infrequent, nor intermittent. Id. Furthermore, the court concluded
that the term is not ambiguous and, therefore, should be given the ordinary meaning
derived from the aforementioned Webster’s dictionary. Id.
152
Id. at 14. “Writings such as personal letters, billboards and signs are not included;
therefore, the statute is not inclusive of all forms of alleged libel.” Id.
153
Id.
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called for legislators “to address the increasingly common phenomenon
of libel and defamation on the information superhighway.”154
The current status of defamation law on the Internet presents both
ongoing problems inherited from the aforementioned troubled
legislative history and new problems emerging from recent, but
apparently unsuccessful, attempts by courts to remedy the issues
through judicial interpretation.155 As noted from the start, perhaps the
most immediately identifiable problems facing the application of
defamation law to the Internet are solidifying the best practices for
regulation and also instilling the necessary patience in the legislature to
listen before they speak.156 The current regulation under the CDA
essentially leaves online content to the whims of self-regulation and, as
such, has created an interesting array of self-help remedies without solid
legal backing.157 The current challenge to the legislatures and the courts
is, and always has been, to define the appropriate framework for
correcting cyber wrongs.158
D. Closing Thoughts
The current state of law and regulatory methods with regard to the
new Internet medium have worked to foreclose tangible relief for
defamation victims by either providing an essentially non-existent legal
framework or granting sweeping immunity to ISPs.159 But this does not
have to be the case.160 Clearly, the pull of the various regulatory players,
including legislatures, courts, and commentators, not to mention the
Internet’s rapidly changing infrastructure, has created more problems in

Id. “The magnitude of computer networks and the consequent communications
possibilities were non-existent at the time this statute was enacted.” Id. See also text
accompanying note 153 (providing the next sentence in the case).
155
See supra Parts II.B–C (discussing the enactment of the CDA and the courts’
interpretation of its application to ISPs and other Internet users).
156
See supra Part I (discussing the framework of the Internet and the inherent problems
with rapidly developing technology).
157
See supra note 57 (discussing flame wars); infra note 180 (discussing web services that
seek to repair reparations of defamed internet users).
158
See infra Part III (discussing the three regulatory methods that have been attempted by
the legislatures and the courts to resolve this problem, including each method’s
drawbacks).
159
See infra Part III.A (discussing the theory behind and the criticism of the selfregulation approach to the Internet, which the author suggests encompassed the provisions
of the CDA).
160
See infra Part V (suggesting that by combining the most effective portions of the
current regulation approaches, in addition to working with the existing framework created
by Congress through the enactment of the CDA, the Internet could be regulated to provide
effective relief for victims of defamatory statements in the online environment).
154
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application than successes in achieving any true regulation.161 This Note
teases apart the preceding discussion to identify and relate three
categorical approaches previously taken by legislatures, courts, and
academics, examining each in turn; however, it also pauses to consider
the potential for overlap and collaboration necessary to the development
of a more effective and workable solution.162
III. ANALYSIS: COMPARING THREE POTENTIAL APPROACHES TO THE
REGULATION OF DEFAMATION ACTIONS ON THE INTERNET
The speed of Internet development and the problems of old law and
new technology create unique challenges for both the legislatures and
the courts.163 It is often stated that the law struggles to keep pace with
technology, and defamation law on the Internet is no exception.164 Each
change in technology creates new possibilities, and lawyers, courts, and
legal scholars struggle to deal with its implications.165 The question often
becomes whether legal frameworks should heed altogether to a
completely self-regulated system, whether it should give way to a new
system of cyberlaws for cyberwrongs, or whether the traditional legal
framework is adequate and should be applied to new technologies,
including the Internet.166
This Part analyzes three existing approaches to Internet regulation
derived from the aforementioned history of the Internet, with an eye
toward developing a workable framework for Internet defamation cases
and resolving the current inconsistency in regulatory attempts.167 First,
Part III.A analyzes self-regulation on the Internet along with its inherent
problems and limitations, including the current self-regulation-focused
provisions of the CDA.168 Next, Part III.B evaluates a cyberlaw approach
that suggests the Internet should retain its own sovereign immunity
from other jurisdictions’s rules, and the weaknesses associated with this
161
See infra Part III (discussing the criticisms of each approach to Internet content
regulation).
162
See infra Part III (categorizing three common methods to Internet regulation and
discussing the drawbacks that must be addressed in order to begin to provide any tangible
relief to online defamation victims).
163
See generally supra note 31 (discussing regulation attempts and the difficulties
encountered).
164
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the treatment of defamatory statements in the online
environment).
165
See infra Part III (discussing the three regulatory methods used in relation to the
Internet and each method’s inherent drawbacks).
166
See generally supra note 86 (for citations to the leading articles regarding self-help,
cyberlaws, and traditional law methods).
167
See infra Part III (analyzing three existing approaches to Internet regulation).
168
See infra Part III.A (discussing the self-help method).
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approach.169 Last, Part III.C scrutinizes the application of pre-existing
legal rules to similar wrongs on the Internet.170 In addition, this Part
considers
the
disadvantages
associated
with
contradictory
interpretations of the applicability of traditional laws to the new Internet
medium, and attempts to reconcile the current inconsistent application of
retraction statutes to the Internet.171
A. Self-Regulation
Under the first approach, the argument for not regulating the
Internet is becoming more controversial.172 In fact, in light of failed
attempts to regulate the Internet, proponents of this approach argue that
it is better to watch the Internet develop than to promote a hasty
intervention.173 Moreover, self-regulation is supported by the notion that
a delay in regulation is appropriate until Internet development slows, its
effects are plain, and the law can create and apply a proper regulatory

See infra Part III.B (discussing the cyberlaws approach).
See infra Part III.C (discussing the traditional laws approach).
171
See infra Part III.C (providing an analysis of the current inconsistency in retraction
statute case law as applied to the Internet).
172
See supra note 30. See also David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1401 (1996). Commenting on the virtues of
developing a self-governance system, the authors note:
The law of any given place must take into account the special
characteristics of the space it regulates and the types of persons, places,
and things found there. Just as a country's jurisprudence reflects its
unique historical experience and culture, the law of Cyberspace will
reflect its special character, which differs markedly from anything
found in the physical world. For example, the law of the Net must
deal with persons who “exist” in Cyberspace only in the form of an email address and whose purported identity may or may not accurately
correspond to physical characteristics in the real world. In fact, an email address might not even belong to a single person. Accordingly, if
Cyberspace law is to recognize the nature of its “subjects,” it cannot
rest on the same doctrines that give geographically based sovereigns
jurisdiction over “whole,” locatable, physical persons. The law of the
Net must be prepared to deal with persons who manifest themselves
only by means of a particular ID, user account, or domain name.
Id.
173
See, e.g., Keith J. Epstein & Bill Tancer, Enforcement of Use Limitations By Internet
Services Providers: “How To Stop That Hacker, Cracker, Spammer, Spoofer, Flamer, Bomber”, 9
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 661, 664 (1997) (suggesting that the existing laws and methods
of lawmaking are inadequate and too swift; therefore, the Internet should be selfregulated); Jason Kay, Sexuality, Live Without A Net: Regulating Obscenity And Indecency On
The Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC L.J. 355, 387 (1995) (“Because government regulation
has been unsuccessful, and self-regulation has succeeded, the Internet should continue to
be allowed to regulate itself.”).
169
170
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regime. 174 In addition, many commentators have also suggested that a
more hands-off approach to the Internet will bolster Internet self-help
that is said to best prevent the chilling effects that would otherwise result
from increased regulation.175 First, this Part analyzes the weaknesses of
the self-regulation approach, highlighting issues and problems with
baseline assumptions, including the ability, response, and effectiveness
that are essential to the success of this type of regulation.176 Next, this
Part examines this theory’s current role as a self-regulatory tool on the
Internet enacted under the guise of the CDA.177 One of the most
important drawbacks to the self-regulation approach is its reliance upon
unprincipled assumptions about Internet actors.178 In short, self-help
allows rogue agencies and unreasonable individual actors to provide
essentially unprincipled regulation of the Internet.179 Moreover, this
174
See Hughes, supra note 31, at 365–69 (describing the effect of a no-law Internet and
determining that it is an understandable, yet flawed, first approach to the borderless
Internet); see also Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L. REV.
993, 1016 (1994) (“The lowest level of self-help is unilateral action by an individual. We
might capture the sense of this measure with the phrase ‘if you don’t like it, don’t
do it.’”).
175
See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing the potential chilling effect of
regulation on Internet speech); see also Chilling Effects, Frequently Asked Questions (and
Answers) About Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org/
faq.cgi#QID76 (last visited Nov. 1, 2007); Dee Pridgen, How Will Consumers Be Protected on
the Information Superhighway?, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 237, 253 (1997) (“The final avenue
for consumer protection on the information superhighway is consumer self-help. Many
Internet users oppose any and all government regulation[] of cyberspace. Some may call it
anarchy, but Internet users label themselves ‘netizens,’ citizens of the Internet world, who
agree to abide by their own self-imposed rules of ‘netiquette.’”); Stuart Elliott, Clinton
Advisor Urges Self-Regulation in Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997 (acknowledging the fear
that growth of the Internet and digital technology would be hampered if “overregulat[ed],
overtax[ed] and overcensor[ed]”).
176
See infra Part III.A (suggesting the notion of whether self-regulation can be effective
depends upon whether there are parties who are willing and able to take the affirmative
steps necessary).
177
See infra Part III.A (discussing the implication of the self-help provisions of the CDA).
178
See supra Part II.A; see also infra note 180 (discussing the Reputation Defender website).
It should be noted that along the continuum of regulatory approaches, self-regulation
represents a simplistic extreme rarely found in the real world. Id. Ultimately, selfregulation depends upon a simple command and control that many participants are
unwilling to undertake resulting in the unprincipled regulation or exploitation by the few
willing to take on the responsibility, often to the detriment of the majority. Id.
179
See generally supra Part II.A. See, e.g., ReputationDefender, ReputationDefender >
About Us, http://www.reputationdefender.com/company (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
Founded in 2006, ReputationDefender was created as a response to the “emerging reality of
the Internet Age” and the erosion of “the line dividing people’s ‘online’ lives from their
‘offline’ personal and professional lives[.]” Id. The site’s purpose is to “find the
unwelcome online content about you or your loved ones, even if it is buried in websites
that are not easily examined with standard online search engines. And if you tell us to do
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theory rests on the notion that a person defamed online can remedy any
harm caused by either contacting the blogger or engaging in countering
the defamatory speech by posting a counter-comment.180 However, the
success of this argument is based upon the assumption that effective selfhelp remedies exist, which essentially means that commentary is
permitted and requests for removal of content will be honored.181
Therefore, the extensive reliance on misguided assumptions taken by
this approach severely diminishes, if not completely eliminates, its useful
application in cyberspace.182
In addition, the idea of counter-speech runs the risk of transforming
into a flame war.183 Speech used in flame wars is often more antagonistic

so, we will work around the clock to get that unwelcome content removed or corrected.”
Id.
Perhaps most disturbing is their answer to the following FAQ:
“Does
ReputationDefender simply send cease-and-desist letters or sue everybody when it seeks to
implement its ‘Destroy’ assistance?” and the corresponding answer,
No. Most of our approaches to assisting in the correction or removal
of content are non-legal. We will only pursue legal options with the
express consent of our clients, and these techniques are strictly
optional and usually the last resort. They may incur additional cost.
In such cases, we do not act as lawyers for our clients. We are not
lawyers or a law firm, and we do not offer legal advice or services.
ReputationDefender, ReputationDefender > Frequently Aasked [sic] Questions,
http://www.reputationdefender.com/faq (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (emphasis added).
180
ReputationDefender, Frequently Aasked [sic] Questions, supra note 179. The appeal
of this viewpoint for many is that without any participation by the legal system, there is no
need to unmask the identity of anonymous bloggers. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464
(Del. 2005). However, the need to determine a person’s identity is derived from the
growing need to repair reputational wrongs in the online environment and dispensing of
this as a requirement through self-regulation does little to assist in remedying the harm
caused, which are better addressed through damages and injunctive relief. Id. At the heart
of the self-regulation drawbacks is the notion that the harmful information remains widely
available and, consequently, continues the harm without any correction. Id.
181
See supra note 63 (noting that some blogs and similar websites do not offer an option
for visitors to comment, which in many ways forecloses a victim’s ability to reach the same
audience, in a manner similar to the defamatory speech).
182
See supra note 63 (noting that some blogs and similar websites do not offer an option
for visitors to comment, which in many ways forecloses a victim’s ability to reach the same
audience, in a manner similar to the defamatory speech).
183
See GATTIKER, supra note 57 for a discussion of “flaming” and “flame wars”. The
author suggests that flame wars are the result of the self-regulation approaches heavy, and
merely speculative, assumptions that new Internet users are capable of and willing to
appropriately regulate their own online affairs. Id. To the contrary, flame wars exacerbate
questions regarding the ability to regulate and the responsibility to regulate that are
important to the success of this rationale. Id. Based on this unprincipled assumption of
user’s ability to self-regulate, there is little hope that self-regulation will ever be compatible
with the legitimacy and enforceability required to protect Internet users from defamation
online. Id.
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than useful in countering harmful speech.184 Furthermore, participants
in flame wars, even if they are not the initial attacker, run the risk of
creating additional defamatory speech.185 Indeed, counter-speech may in
fact provide little remedy and defamation victims, unable to obtain
retractions or removals from the original source, would be left with little
real remedy other than to rebut the accusations on their own.186 Thus, a
lack of Internet regulation would provide a greater benefit to would-be
defendants and extremely low protection, without substantial non-legal
efforts, to Internet defamation plaintiffs.187
The CDA provides a modern example of regulations that can be
categorized aptly as self-help in the area of defamation law; however,
this Note, as stated previously, concedes that this method fails to
adequately protect real-life rights in the online environment.188 The CDA
does not provide a complete bar to defamation suits on the Internet.189
Instead, the statute bars only plaintiffs who seek relief from the deep
pockets of ISPs.190 While an ISP is immune, the CDA does not provide
any immunity from liability for the original poster.191 In fact, the CDA’s
purpose is to promote self-help on the Internet and prevent the potential
chilling effect that regulation may have on Internet speech.192 However,
with a great number of responsible parties potentially judgment-proof

184
See DERY, supra note 57, at 1–2 (describing flame wars as a battle between two online
users, and noting that speech used in flame wars is often hostile, the author compares their
contribution to discussion as on par with bathroom graffiti).
185
See supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing flame wars and their potential
effects).
186
See GATTIKER, supra note 57, at 195 (defining flame wars). The author suggests that
engaging in flame wars does not effectively repair an individual’s reputation, nor does it
have the potential to provide any relief in the form of damages. Id.
187
See supra Part III.A (discussing one of the non-legal measures Internet defamation
victims can take). The effect of self-regulation in the realm of Internet defamation allows
defendants too much free reign without consequence. See supra Part III.A. Defendants are
not required to take any action to correct a false statement, which runs contrary to the
expectations established by the common law doctrine of defamation. See supra Part II.C.1
(discussing the importance placed upon the ability to safeguard reputation).
188
See supra note 63 (discussing the difficulty in correcting defamatory speech posted on
another’s website).
189
See supra notes 97–99 (discussing how original source liability is not foreclosed by the
provisions of the CDA which have been interpreted to allow only immunity for ISPs).
190
See supra notes 97–99 (discussing how original source liability is not foreclosed by the
provisions of the CDA which have only been interpreted to allow immunity for ISPs).
However, the author suggests recent case law shows a move toward the imposition of
injunctive orders on ISPs despite their ever-broadening immunity from liability for
damages. See infra Part V.
191
See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006).
192
See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing the chilling effect too much
regulation may have on the open Internet dialogue enjoyed by so many users today).
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and foreclosure from recovery by the immunity granted online
providers, the CDA has created little, if any, tangible recovery for online
defamation victims through self-help methods.193
In conclusion, the principal weakness of the self-regulation
argument is its complete separation from common law doctrines.194 In
fact, there is little reason to assume that the purpose behind defamation
laws does not apply to postings on the Internet, just as there is little
reason to presume that such Internet postings warrant less protection
than other postings because of the medium involved.195 This approach
creates “a ‘continuing race of offensive and defensive technologies’s on
the Internet . . . metaphorical to some and very real to others[] . . . it is a
race in which no one should expect a final ‘winner.’”196 Indeed, this
encouragement of bad behavior with little disincentive hardly provides
even more minimal protection for reputational harms on the Internet
than a more substantive, legal rules-based approaches might offer.197
B. Cyberlaws
A second approach to Internet regulation calls for new cyberlaws in
cyberspace.198 A cyberlaw approach seeks to address the new medium
as well as the new types of relationships that exist in cyberspace.199

193
See Hughes, supra note 31, at 1367. The author suggests that based upon Internet
demographic information many of the potential defendants to an Internet defamation suit
are without the means to provide any tangible relief to the victims of their defamatory
statements. Id. Without access to the deeper pockets of Internet ISPs and the nominal relief
provided to those able to post replies or effectively access the same audience as the original
message, plaintiffs are left with little available remedy to repair their reputation. Id.
194
See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the basic principles behind the law of defamation).
195
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing defamation law as striking a
necessary balance between the preservation of one’s reputation and the freedom of
expression).
196
See Hughes, supra note 31, at 368 (footnote omitted).
197
See supra Part II.C.2 and accompanying text (discussing common law retraction
statutes).
198
See Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1367. See also Manish Lunker, Cyber Laws: A
Global
Perspective,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN005846.pdf
(last visited on Oct. 16, 2008). The concept of cyberlaw stems from the broad territorial
reach of the Internet that creates a boundary-less medium and undercuts the “feasibility
and legitimacy of applying laws based on geographic boundaries.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
This perspective suggests the enactment of necessary legislation in all countries for the
prevention of computer related crime.
199
See Johnson & Post, supra note 31, at 1367. In 1996, Johnson and Post characterized the
virtual world as separate and apart from the “real world[,]” and they added that “[t]his
new boundary defines a distinct Cyberspace that needs and can create its own law and
legal institutions.” Id. More specifically, the authors viewed the Internet as its own legal
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Moreover, it recognizes the speed and volume of Internet-facilitated
cross-border communication that may prevent adequate enforcement
under existing legal rules.200 However, this theory is largely based upon
the fact that “[n]o one accidentally strays across the border into
Cyberspace[,]” and implies the Internet is its own jurisdiction.201 This
Part explores the basic theory behind the cyberlaw approach and
provides an examination of its inherent weaknesses relevant to the
continued discussion of the best practices for the regulation of Internet
content introduced in Part III.B.202
A strong argument against early conclusions regarding the need for
cyberlaws is the seamless intertwinement of everyday life to the Internet,
likely not considered more than ten years ago. The Internet has quickly
crossed the threshold into the real world—technologically, socially, and
economically.203 Indeed, “[a]s our appliances [have] become ‘smart,’ our
houses become [increasingly] ‘wired,’ our . . . cable, telephone, and
Internet services bundle and unbundle,” and with our life events
“Googled” and “Facebooked,” it becomes increasingly difficult to
identify cyberspace as a separate and distinct world.204 With the
significant, and altogether seamless, contributions cyberspace makes in
our everyday lives, few could be expected to know when they have left
reality and entered the cyberspace jurisdiction—a picture message? or a
phone call?205 Likewise, few would expect their rights to be protected
jurisdiction, a new sovereign within which lurked the opportunity to rethink law and
implement more distinct and rational rules. Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 1379. See generally supra Part II.A (discussing the scope of the new Internet
communities). The author of this Note suggests that the extent to which this underlying
principle remains true today is in jeopardy. See generally supra Part II.A. With every new
technological advancement, the line between the two separate and distinct jurisdictions
envisioned by this approach becomes increasingly blurred. See generally supra Part II.A.
Mobile computing has greatly advanced every day tasks to include networked connections
that take place at the border of each virtual jurisdiction, therefore, as in the case of other
legislative efforts to develop and enact laws that apply to cyberspace will be both daunting
and likely plagued by the same inability to keep pace with the technology of the future. See
generally supra Part II.A.
202
See infra Part III.B.
203
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the immersion of the Internet into
entertainment, consumer spending, and popular culture).
204
See Hughes, supra note 31. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the
Internet’s effect on every aspect of our modern lives).
205
See supra note 7 (the author of this Note comments on the seamless nature of the
Internet and the increasing inability to separate out non-networked tasks for treatment by
the common law). In addition, the author suggests that the creation of different rights to be
applied in cyberspace would create an even greater incentive to perform tasks in the
networked environment in an effort to take advantage of an underdeveloped legal
framework. See supra note 7.
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any differently in cyberspace than in other settings. 206 For example,
when one completes a bank transaction online, would the bank or
account holder expect that different set of laws will apply to that
transaction that are distinct from those that apply to their transactions in
local bank branches?207 No, and similarly, no one would expect
defamation law to treat postings on a school message board or locker in
a particular state to be treated any differently than a posting on a virtual
message board or blog from a computer in the same state.208
C. Traditional Legal Frameworks
The third approach to Internet regulation, proposing the use of
traditional legal principles, suggests that the Internet should be treated
no differently than previous telecommunications technology, such as
Morse code or the telephone.209 The Internet does not foreclose the
application of pre-existing laws; something unlawful, regulated, or
licensed does not become lawful, unregulated, and unlicensed merely
because it occurs on the Internet.210
Though faster and more
comprehensive, the Internet still involves communication between
individuals over distances.211 Consequently, existing legal rules can be
applied to the Internet.212 However, there exists an interpretive concern
See Hughes, supra note 31, at 371 (making similar comparisons and conclusion in the
area of online securities).
207
Id.
208
Id.; see also Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1147
(2000) (noting that “‘cyberlaw,’ or the ‘law of the Internet,’” does not usefully exist. “Very
few bodies of law are defined by their characteristic technologies. Tort law is not ‘the law
of the automobile,’ even though the auto accident is the paradigmatic tort case. Nor is
urban zoning ‘the law of the elevator.’”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (announcing that there was no more a “law of cyberspace”
than there was a “Law of the Horse”).
209
Id. See also ANNA MANCINI, INTERNET JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW FOR THE
VIRTUAL WORLD 76 (Buenos Books Americas LLC 2005). Mancini concludes that law and
philosophy were conceived for a material economic world driven by scarcity and
territoriality. Id. at 75–80. Without the criterion of territoriality, the dominant philosophies
of law in the virtual world may be left bankrupt. Id. This is especially the case in pure
theories of law, in which the territoriality criterion is the cornerstone. Id. Mancini proposes
a philosophy of justice that is suited to the virtual world and would involve mapping
traditional legal principles into international laws to cure territoriality issues that plague
the Internet’s development. Id.
210
Id.
211
See supra Part II.A (discussing the various forms of Internet communication that at
their core simply allow individuals to reach and connect with others quickly over
substantially large distances).
212
See supra Part II.A (discussing the various forms of Internet communication that at its
core simply allow individuals to reach and connect with others quickly over substantially
large distances).
206
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in this area wherein traditional legal principles have been applied
inconsistently, particularly in the area of defamation law and retraction
strategy.213 Therefore, unlike the discussion of the flaws of a particular
method in Parts III.A–B, this Part instead analyzes the inconsistent
approach taken by the courts as a drawback to the application of
traditional laws in Internet defamation cases.214
The uncertainty of the courts in both the Cannon and It’s in the Cards
Internet defamation lawsuits demonstrates that concerns regarding the
application of traditional laws to the Internet are not merely
theoretical.215 In one instance, courts will protect individual Internet
posters the same as their print and broadcast publishing counterparts,216
but, as the second instance demonstrates, this may not always be the
case.217 Indeed, in many jurisdictions, retraction statutes do not extend
to Internet publishing but instead make explicit reference to the
statutes’s application to print and broadcast media.218 Therein lies the
inconsistency in the application of traditional defamation law that must
be reconciled—should retraction statutes apply to the Internet?219 In
other words, are the statutes’s purposes and references broad enough to
include online communications and flexible enough to work with
existing laws?220
Based on the substance of the preceding analysis, the inconsistency
in the courts’s application of traditional retraction statutes in Cannon and
It’s in the Cards may be reconciled by examining the reasoning employed
by each court.221 In Cannon, the court explained that its decision to
prohibit the plaintiff from collecting punitive damages was due to the
213
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the holding in Cannon which permitted the application
of retraction statutes and the courts refusal to allow application of retraction statutes to
Internet publications in It’s in the Cards).
214
See infra Part III.C.
215
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the holding in Cannon, which held that traditional
retraction laws also applied to the Internet, and the holding in It’s in the Cards, which held
traditional retraction laws do not apply to the Internet).
216
See supra Part II.C.2.
217
See supra Part II.C.2.
218
See supra note 136 (discussing the various retraction statutes within the United States).
In addition, some state defamation laws require that a retraction be requested prior to
conferring any right to sue for defamation to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Mathis v Cannon, 573
S.E.2d 376, 383 (2002) (holding that “OCGA § 51-5-11, the state retraction statute, provides
that a plaintiff in any libel action shall not be entitled to any punitive damages if the
defendant corrects and retracts the libelous statement ‘in a regular issue of the newspaper
or other publication in question’ after receiving a written demand[]”).
219
See infra Part IV.
220
See infra Part IV.
221
See supra Part II.C.3 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of both
the Cannon and It’s in the Cards decisions).
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plaintiff’s failure to request a retraction.222 Indeed, in explaining its
decision to prohibit the plaintiff from collecting punitive damages for
failure to request a retraction, the court hoped to “encourage[]
defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by ‘using
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.’”223 The court, in
encouraging the use of traditional defamation remedies in tandem with
the notion of self-help remedies in cyberspace, hoped to “strike[] a
balance in favor of ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate in an age
of communications when ‘anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to
the Internet’ can address a worldwide audience of readers in
cyberspace.”224 By contrast, as previously discussed, the Court in It’s in
the Cards, rejected the application of traditional legal principles to
cyberspace and called for the legislatures to enact new cyberlaws for the
treatment of defamation on the Internet.225
At its core, the inconsistency between the following two cases can be
attributed to, and resolved as, a conflict among regulatory methods.226
In Cannon, the court pushed the use of traditional retraction statutes as a
method for self-help, pulling together both the traditional law approach
and the underlying self-help purpose of section 230.227 However, in It’s
in the Cards, the court resorted to the previously discussed cyberlaws
approach, calling for the legislature to enact laws that apply to the
Internet and provide greater recognition of its unique characteristics.228
In Cannon, the plaintiff was allowed recovery for the injury to his
reputation, and to the contrary, in It’s in the Cards, the plaintiff was
denied recovery despite an extensive and well-developed body of
common law defamation principles.229 Thus, a rejection of the traditional

See supra note 145 (describing the underlying reasons the court read the state
retraction statute broadly to apply to all defamatory statements, including those by Mathis
in his message board posting).
223
See Cannon v. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974)).
224
See Cannon v. Mathis, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
851–53 (1997)); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
225
See supra note 154 and accompanying text (explaining the refusal by the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals to apply present libel law to cyberspace).
226
See supra Part III.A (discussing three regulatory methods that have been applied to the
Internet).
227
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
228
See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text.
229
See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the facts of both Cannon and It’s in the Cards).
222
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law approach by the courts may yield perverse results in determining
plaintiffs’ recovery.230
The inherent problems with the self-regulation and cyberlaw
approach and, in addition, the perverse results reached by the courts’s
inconsistent application of traditional defamation principles to the
Internet have created both persistent and emerging problems.231 As
noted at the outset of this analysis, a workable solution is necessary to
prevent the perverse effects of the current state of the law that deprives
plaintiffs of any meaningful recovery for their injuries, and defendants of
an opportunity to mitigate their damages.232
IV. CONTRIBUTION: PERSISTENT PROBLEMS, EMERGING PROBLEMS, AND
MODEST RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A LASTING SOLUTION
Internet defamation jurisprudence is in general inconsistent, and
many of the solutions proposed do not adequately track the primary
goals of defamation actions, as discussed above, to provide vindication
for one’s good name.233 The inconsistent Internet defamation principles
stem from two competing interests. On the one hand, the interest is in
preserving the free flow of communication on the Internet. The lack of
regulation and the broad grant of section 230 immunity preclude many
sources of online speech from liability for defamation in furtherance of
this interest.234 On the other hand, this first interest competes with the
interest that victims of defamatory speech have in the vindication of their
good name and other remedies. Taking this basic conflict into account,
this Note recognizes the proper solution may require the law to take the
middle ground—seeking a solution that allows cybertort defendants to
mitigate their damages and provides incentives for correction, which
may incidentally improve plaintiffs’ abilities to receive some redress for
their injuries.

230
Furthermore, the author suggests that the duplication of the court’s decision in It’s in
the Cards or, alternatively, the legislature’s failure to broaden existing retraction statutes
may deny victims any chance of recovery under the traditional law approach. See supra
note 137 (discussing the substance of state retraction statutes). Moreover, many states
require that a plaintiff first demand a retraction prior to instituting an action for defamation
that would further deny plaintiffs any meaningful recovery if the reasoning employed by
the court in It’s in the Cards is followed. See supra note 137.
231
See supra Part III (discussing the drawbacks and inconsistency in the current
regulatory approaches to Internet defamation).
232
See infra Part V (discussing the author’s mid-ground solution to the drawbacks and
inconsistency that have prevented plaintiffs from meaningful recovery for cyberwrongs).
233
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
234
See supra notes 97–104 (discussing the broad grant of immunity given ISPs under
section 230 and the courts later interpretations).
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Thus, this Part first briefly discusses the existing self-help provisions
of section 230 and, subsequently, proposes and examines the benefits of a
broad interpretation of traditional retraction statutes as an effective but
modest approach that has the ability to work in tandem with this
existing framework.235 Prior to this discussion, it is conceded that this
imperfect solution is not an answer that completely preserves either the
interest in the preservation of speech, or, for that matter, the interest of
persons harmed by defamatory online speech. Nevertheless, this
solution creates a better balance of the conflicting interests at stake by
providing the backing of a strong common law legal framework that has
survived the prior innovations of radio and broadcast media, without
resorting to drastic legal changes or less-than-effective inaction.
Under section 230, the current self-help model, ISPs are immune
from liability in damages for defamatory content posted on their
websites.236 Despite the criticism in recent years to upend this ZeranBlumenthal-Barrett interpretation of section 230, the courts’ interpretation
has instead extended the immunity granted and, as a result, parties
defamed online have both retained formidable obstacles that must be
overcome in seeking legal recourse and become the subject of ineffective
self-help remedies.237
The Zeran-Blumenthal-Barrett interpretation continues to engage
courts in the practice of denying victims of libelous speech any recourse
in favor of the CDA’s purpose of encouraging self-governance in the
online environment.238
In effect, Congress and the courts have
underlined the notion that parties harmed by defamatory online speech
can readily respond because the barriers to entry remain low, and

235
While a number of the provisions of the CDA were determined unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court, the CDA remains a barrier to both further regulation and relief in
online defamation lawsuits. See supra Part II.B.2. Therefore, the author suggests that any
meaningful regulatory solution for this type of cyberwrong must take into account the
limitations created by the CDA. See supra Part II.B.2.
236
See generally supra Part II.B. See also Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trustees of
Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561 (E.D. Va. 1998) (suggesting that section
230 provides immunity from actions for damages but does not provide immunity for
actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief). If retraction statutes are broadened to
cover Internet content, then this proposed solution would be the most effective solution in
providing relief despite the immunity granted by the CDA. Id. In fact, if ISPs are subject to
declaratory and injunctive relief, retraction statutes would allow demands for retraction to
be made to the ISPs directly. Id. While many commentators have undertaken an extensive
search to find ways in which ISPs can be engaged to regulate the Internet, this solution
would accomplish that task in the area of defamation law. Id.
237
See generally supra Part IV (analyzing the various approaches to Internet regulation).
238
See supra Part II.B (discussing the Zeran-Blumenthal-Barrett interpretation of the
provisions of the CDA).
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significant technological ability is no longer needed.239 Thus, while
online content providers revel in the immunity granted under section
230, this approach alone neither repairs, nor prevents, the harm caused
to victims of defamatory online speech.
However, despite the limitations created by the courts’ interpretation
of the CDA provisions, the legislature and the courts can tip the balance
of interests in favor of providing plaintiffs adequate relief for damage
caused to their reputation. By applying section 230 in tandem with
traditional retraction statutes, this Note suggests that courts may be able
to give legal effect to existing self-help remedies in the online
environment.
While some interpretations of section 230 have merely protected the
interests of online content providers, the additional self-help protections
instructed by Cannon’s application of traditional retraction laws to the
Internet create a workable solution for victims of online defamation.
This solution both empowers defamed parties with the force of law and
creates a cost-effective way for online speakers to minimize their
liability. First, with the adoption of retraction statutes applicable to the
Internet, a publisher of defamatory speech would be required to act,
allowing for both recognition that the speech is harmful and for some
vindication of an Internet defamation victim’s reputation. Although it is
still open to debate whether a retraction is sufficient to redress the
wrong, the increased risk of judgment-proof defendants online may
make retraction the best option toward receiving any relief, even if it is
only minimal. Moreover, cyberspace as a low-cost medium allows for
greater ease in retracting harmful speech online. Finally, it traces the
beneficial bricks-and-mortar principles developed for the mitigation of
damages incurred by Internet defendants sued for harmful speech and
lessens the chilling effects associated with the cost of aversion.
In addition, retraction statutes may impose a minimal duty upon
ISPs to respond if failure to do so would affect the plaintiff’s ability to
bring their lawsuit.240 Under the current CDA model for immunity, ISPs
are immune from damages and have yet to be held liable in actions for
declaratory or injunctive relief.241 Thus, this solution provides legal
means to engage ISPs despite their long history of immunity from
actions for damages. Moreover, this Note recognizes that applying
See supra notes 6–9 (discussing the demographics of Internet users); see also supra Part
II.A.2 (discussing the ability for a large range of users to become Internet publishers given
the accessibility and increasingly easy to use software applications).
240
See supra note 137 (stating that some defamation actions cannot be brought until a
retraction is first requested).
241
See Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (holding that ISPs are only immune
from actions for damages under section 230).
239
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retraction statutes in tandem with the CDA will provide necessary legal
backing to the spirit of self-help, while recognizing that it is not a perfect
solution to redressing the harm experienced by victims of defamatory
speech. Nevertheless, this union brings greater balance to the interests of
robust and wide-open debate online and redressing the harm felt by
victims of online defamation.
Finally, this middle-ground approach carries with it the potential to
engage ISPs, a solution that ultimately benefits both online speakers
through the mitigation of punitive damages and those whom they
defame by providing some retribution for their injury. Until the true
implications of the Internet are realized in the years to come, this
solution will provide the necessary relief from online defamation and
offers an excellent alternative to hasty, comprehensive regulations.
The solution to the problem of defamatory online speech, given the
diverse attempts to regulate the Internet that have created an uneasy
landscape for further development, is not an easy one, but the timing is
ripe for continued development of regulations. Currently, the state of
Internet law remains at a juncture where hasty self-help legislation, not
unlike the CDA, has created rights and immunities likely to continue to
evolve. Moreover, the nature of this quickly expanding technology,
although it has produced cries for reformation, is unlikely to be
adequately served by a resort to the development of comprehensive
legislation. This middle-ground solution—expanding the reach of
retraction statutes developed at common law—though not without its
flaws, seems plausible as a long-term solution to some of the current
problems.
Most importantly, this approach balances competing
interests, utilizing existing regulatory frameworks and greater efficiency,
flexibility, and predictability associated with traditional laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Internet defamation highlights the conflict between the rights of
individuals to speak freely and the need of those individuals to protect
their reputation. As the Internet continues to expand its reach
technologically, socially, and economically, the problem of Internet
defamation will no doubt continue. The consistent changes in the
Internet’s breadth and scope as a primary communication medium,
including changes to its regulatory structure, pose serious questions as to
the best practices for regulating this new online jurisdiction. Moreover,
in this new environment, the protection of both free speech rights and
individual reputations will require more vigilance on behalf of the courts
and legislatures. However, until a comprehensive solution is reached,
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the current self-help provisions of the CDA working alongside common
law retraction statutes can provide a modest and effective solution.
As the hypothetical lawsuit presented in Part I reveals, self-help
alone is not an effective alternative for individuals defamed online. As
discussed, the common law retraction strategy developed with the intent
to protect individuals and relieve misguided defendants from punitive
damages. This principle has survived newspapers, radio, and broadcast
television, and there is no reason to suggest it cannot do the same for the
Internet. Working in tandem with the CDA’s self-help purpose, a broad
interpretation of state retraction statutes could provide the hypothetical
law student discussed in Part I with the means necessary to engage ISPs
and website owners, as well as users, to provide a true remedy for the
harm caused.
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